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BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION: DOES IT DEGRADE THE CONCEPT OF  
THE OPERATION'S EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING  
THE MISSION?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

WADE D RUSH, MAJ, USA  
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1982

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS  
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Wade D. Rush

Title of Thesis: Battlefield Organization: Does It Degrade the Concept  
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Approved by:

Edward J. Brennan, Thesis Committee Chairman  
Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Brennan, M.B.A.

Jeffrey S. Shadburn, Member  
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Shadburn, M.M.A.S.

Steven L. Davis, Member  
Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Davis, M.S.

Kenneth R. Garren Consulting Faculty  
Colonel Kenneth R. Garren, Ph.D.

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

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## ABSTRACT

BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION: DOES IT DEGRADE THE CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION'S EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION, MAJ Wade D. Rush, USA, 126 pages.

This study investigated how battlefield organization effects the commander's ability to accomplish his mission. Using FM 100-5, dated 1993, *AirLand Battle*, battlefield organization is defined as close, deep, and rear, which also encompasses the traditional five complementary elements. Specifically, for combat arms at brigade level and below, does the use of battlefield organization degrade the commander's concept of the operation in accomplishing the mission?

Utilizing a survey group, the study determined the relationship of battlefield organization's relationship with concept of the operation's effectiveness. The study used the survey group to measure how effective the concept of the operation communicated its essential elements. Based on the measured understanding, the study established a quantitative measure on the effectiveness of the concept of the operation. After establishing a known reference point, the study then measured the survey group's use of battlefield organization relative to those same concept of the operations. From these measurement, the research was able to establish conclusions on battlefield organization's utility and influence on the concept of the operation's effectiveness.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

This study focused on how Field Manual(FM) 100-5's concept of battlefield organization affects combat unit's mission success. With the publications of the 1982, FM 100-5, *AirLand Battle*, the Army made a decision to change its doctrine on how to fight. The Army has since revised this capstone document twice with the latest publication dated June 1993. The *AirLand Battle* (ALB) doctrine recognized that battlefield characteristics were very lethal and nonlinear. The new doctrine further characterized the battlefield as containing "three closely related sets of activities" within the area of operation.<sup>1</sup> Called battlefield organization, these three closely related activities are deep, close, and rear operations.<sup>2</sup>

Do tactical leaders use the concept of battlefield organization beyond its intended function? When developing combat operation orders, does the soldier rely on battlefield organization as the primary vehicle in developing the unit's tactics? If so, what impact does the application of battlefield organization have on warfighting? Certainly, an inadequately developed concept of the operation will directly degrade the commander's ability to accomplish his mission. Hence, this research explored the question: For combat arms at brigade level and below, does the use of battlefield organization degrade the concept of the operation's effectiveness in accomplishing the mission?

Delimitations: The analysis was limited to operations which have already occurred at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Specifically, this research analyzed four selected operation orders (OPORD) that were conducted from 1992 to 1995. The analysis did not address the selected OPORDs' execution or results of the execution. It did not analyze the effects of the unit's caliber of leadership, proficiency of staff training, status of weather, or availability of time in developing the selected OPORDs. The study did not analyze the effects of the higher headquarter's quality of order on the selected OPORDs. To reduce the scope of the doctrinal analysis, this study limited its review to current doctrine ranging from 1976 to 1995. Finally, the study required a survey group to analyze the research problem. However, due to resource constraints, time limitations, and lack of authority to expand the officers pool, the study was restricted to the available pool of officers located at Fort Leavenworth.

Limitations: Fort Leavenworth had a limited repository of data on OPORDs. Division to corps data was insufficient to conduct this research. CTC Archive contained sufficient records to allow the study to focus only at the battalion and brigade size combat units.

Assumptions: The following assumptions were made: (a) The sample of selected OPORDs obtained from the CTCs reflected the Army's typical operation order. This study also recognized that an OPORD continues to change and evolve until the mission is completed. As information changes, the unit continually refines and changes the OPORD until the mission is completed. Some OPORDS have evolved to such a degree that at the time of execution, they do not even resemble the



original documents. (b) At the point in time when the OPORD was initially published, its contents (which were archived at the CTC Archive at Fort Leavenworth) represented the unit's best tactical rationale in the development of the concept of the operation. (c) Up to the beginning of 1996, the officer corps was primarily still executing the 1986 FM 100-5 doctrine. The Army, like any organization, required time to inculcate a new concept or change in concept. The amount of time to fully inculcate FM 100-5 within the Army was not known. However, prior to the publication of the 1993 FM 100-5, this study assumed that the Army fully understood, endorsed, and was executing the intent of the 1986 FM 100-5's AirLand Battle. Consequently, OPORDS sampled between 1992 and 1995, inclusive, still reflected the AirLand Battle's 1986 version.

Definitions: (1) decisive point, (2) battlefield organization, and (3) concept of the operation. The research clarified these doctrinal concepts in chapters 3 and 4.

Ultimately, this study determined if battlefield organization was distorting the U.S. Army's tactical decision-making processes in developing operation orders capable of accomplishing the mission. More importantly though, it provided an indication that the Army's officers' educational development was focused on prescriptive science rather than the art of war.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations  
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 6-13.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 6-13.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review focused on two subjects: battlefield organization and the concept of the operation. In researching battlefield organization, the study took two approaches. The first approach was to determine the origin and development of battlefield organization. The second approach was to find the literature which specifically discussed the impact of battlefield organization on warfighting.

The origin and development of battlefield organization had a wealth of indirect literature. Other than the Field Manual series, no documents were found which directly addressed the origin or the development of battlefield organization. Rather, in both the field manuals and in doctrinal debates, pieces or elements of battlefield organization were discussed. The FM 100-5 series provided the best historical picture of the structural evolution of the concept. However, during the course of the research, none of the literature directly addressed battlefield organization's history, development, or evolution. The best sources of information on the early development and evolution of battlefield organization were the *Military Review* and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Historical Monograph series--"From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982," by John L. Romjue.

Primarily through the *Military Review*, the Army conducted a tremendous debate about the active defense. During the period from 1976 to 1984, the *Military Review* recorded a large part of the debates about the Army's doctrine. There were many contributors to the debate. Soldiers, such as General Donn A. Starry, Major General L. D. Holder, Colonel Clyde J. Tate, Brigadier General Lon E. Maggert, and others, voiced their concerns during the late seventies and early 1980s. Taken as a whole, the debates showed a definite link to battlefield organization.

Romjue's study on the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine does not directly talk about battlefield organization. However, Romjue's collective analysis matches closely with the *Military Review* debates. Looking at the debate as a whole rather than individual pieces, the development of battlefield organization evolved indirectly into clear patterns of discussion. These patterns of discussions became the primary sources for developing conclusions about the history of battlefield organization.

Finally, *The Defense Reform Debate* provided input on the rationale of AirLand Battle. Several articles were written ranging from military experts, such as Brigadier General Huba Wass De Czege to the civilian military analyst Mr. William S. Lind. This book provided valuable military hindsight on why the Army adopted AirLand Battle doctrine. The quantity of indirect literature was sufficiently valuable to glean some plausible conclusions on the development and evolution of battlefield organization.

On the other hand, there was no literature which specifically discussed battlefield organization as a whole. Many articles and manuals discussed components of battlefield organization. Deep operations are continually discussed in the majority of the literature but in isolation from the other elements. This is a common problem because the literature tended to discuss each element of the battlefield organization in near isolation from the others. Two Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) theses discussed battlefield organization as one system: "Battlefield Framework and How It Relates to a 19th Century Indian Battle: Washita" by Major Michael G. Padgett and "BEDA FOMM: An Operational Analysis" by Lieutenant Colonel James G. Bierwirth. In his 1994 thesis, Major Michael Padgett provided a cursory glance at the development of battlefield organization. However, his work was not in sufficient depth and can be misleading. Lieutenant Colonel Bierwirth discussed battlefield organization in context with battle space. It has little relevance to the research study.

The literature on the concept of the operations was primarily found in the current field manuals. The field manuals collectively provided sufficient information on defining the concept of the operation. FM 7-20 provided the most encompassing doctrinal approach in developing a clear, concise, and purposeful concept of the operation.

The research determined that the periodicals provided a wealth of analysis that collectively showed the initial origin and intent for battlefield organization. Beyond the initial origin of battlefield organization, the remaining literature focused on the evolving field manuals, particularly FM 100-5, during the period 1982 to 1993.

## CHAPTER 3

### DOCTRINE

#### Concept of the Operation

In order to accomplish the mission with some degree of success, combat units require a valid concept of the operation. FM 101-5 defines the concept of the operation as the "commander's description of how he visualizes the conduct of the operation."<sup>1</sup> It communicates how each subordinate unit's actions interrelate with each other to accomplish the mission.<sup>2</sup> It is the central expression of the commander's ability to impose his will and initiative upon the enemy.

Essential to the concept of the operation is the development of an effective course of action (COA). The course of action is the unit's plan to accomplish the mission. In tactical combat units, the course of action defines only the missions of the infantry, armor, and attack helicopter aviation units. Combat support and combat service support units, such as artillery and logistic units, are normally not included in the course of action. Within the course of action, doctrine stresses the analytical application of several principles: decisive point, maneuver, mass, initiative, leadership, main effort, supporting effort, economy of force, and so on. Of these, the decisive point provides the COA with a theoretical focal point for determining subordinate units' missions.<sup>3</sup>

Decisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. . . . Commanders designate the most important decisive points as objectives and allocate resources to seize or destroy them.<sup>4</sup>

An effective COA masses the effects of forces at the decisive time and place (the decisive point).

The COA utilizes the main effort and supporting efforts to concentrate combat power at the most decisive point. The main effort's unique purpose is to control the most decisive point which will accomplish the mission. The main effort's focus at the most decisive point sets the conditions that enables the unit to accomplish its mission. The supporting efforts' purposes enable the main effort to focus its combat power at the most decisive point. The interrelationship between the main effort and the supporting efforts constitutes a COA focused at the decisive point to accomplish the mission.

Determining the decisive point is an art. A variety of variables influence the commander's ability to select the most decisive point for a COA. The commander draws on his personal experience, the unit's morale, inputs from his subordinates, weather forecasts, and other variables. These variables are examples of both tangible: combat power, weather, etc.--and intangible factors such as morale, leadership, and so on. However, doctrinally, the determination of the most decisive point also has a specific structure.

1. In every engagement, the unit will achieve its mission's purpose at the most decisive point? (Purpose is the "why" component of the mission statement.)<sup>5</sup>



2. In every engagement, the decisive point has three dimensions.

- a. TIME (When it will occur)
- b. LOCATION (Where it will occur)
- c. EVENT/ACTIVITY/EFFECT (What event/activity or effect allows it to form)<sup>6</sup>

3. In every engagement, the terrain or enemy disposition/orientation affects the decisive point's three dimensions?<sup>7</sup>

4. In every engagement, the decisive point can move or change as the conditions on the battlefield change.<sup>8</sup>

5. In every engagement, the decisive point is a tool to focus and synchronize combat power.<sup>9</sup>

Visualizing these elements of decisive points as colors on a painter's palette, the commander, like an artist, determines his most decisive point. The commander then articulates his interpretation of the decisive point in the concept of the operation. When the commander's decisive point is not developed, it is unlikely that the course of action will generate and mass enough combat power effects to exert the commander's will decisively against the enemy.

If the commander structures his course of action through these elements and principles, each and every subordinate commander should understand the commander's concept of the operation focus in exerting his will against the enemy. If the concept of the operation is clear, concise, and purposeful, the subordinate commanders will understand the operation's three essential points:

1. Each subordinate commander can identify the senior commander's most decisive point.

2. Each subordinate commander understands his purpose as a main effort or as a supporting effort.

3. Each subordinate commander understands the interrelationship between the main effort and the supporting efforts.

If the subordinates have a common understanding of these points, then the commander's concept of the operation is effective in accomplishing the mission. In addition, if the decisive point changes during the operation, the commander has a common point to adjust his subordinate's missions.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1984), 5-10.

<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 6-6.

<sup>3</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1992), 2-16.

<sup>4</sup>FM 100-5, 1993, 6-7, 6-8.

<sup>5</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Brennan, Slide on AirLand Battle doctrine (Decisive Point) #CA7C03-5A, A306 course, Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 1996.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 4

### EVOLUTION OF BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION

After the Vietnam conflict, the US Army began a major refocus of its tactical and strategic posture. The various catalysts and logical reasons for these changes are many and are beyond the scope or purpose of this study. In essence though, the Army shifted its attention from a low--to high--intensity conflict which was most likely to be fought in a European theater. In 1974, General William E. Depuy assumed command of the new Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and began to reorient the Army's focus toward this high-intensity warfare. Eventually his changes produced the 1976, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, called the "active defense" doctrine. The importance of this field manual ultimately inspired a tremendous intellectual debate within the Army.<sup>1</sup> The ensuing debates influenced and created the publication of 1982 FM 100-5, *AirLand Battle Operations*. Because of the significant doctrinal change between the field manuals, the doctrine writers created battlefield organization to graphically communicate the major doctrinal changes to the Army.

#### Active Defense's Five Doctrinal Issues Requiring Change

There were many good, bad, and/or misunderstood issues concerning the adequacy of the 1976 doctrine. This study determined five key, debatable issues which served as reference points for the

development of battlefield organization: (1) countering the Soviet Union's emerging doctrine, (2) relying on a linear defense, (3) inadequate offensive initiative, (4) dominance of firepower, and (5) the absence of reserves. These debate issues provided an accurate understanding of why battlefield organization was initially developed.

#### Countering the Soviet Union's Emerging Doctrine

The officer corps was debating whether the 1976 active defense was adequate in countering the Soviet Union's emerging tactical/operational doctrine. The 1976 FM 100-5 stated the following:

The Soviet Army, for example, attacks on very narrow fronts in great depth, with artillery massed at 70 to 100 tubes per kilometer in the breakthrough sector. Against a US division in Europe, Warsaw Pact forces might throw as many as 600 tanks into the leading echelon, followed by an equal number shortly thereafter.<sup>2</sup>

To defend against this breakthrough tactics, division commanders were expected to "not only concentrate at the right time and place, but they also must take risks on the flanks."<sup>3</sup> Major Lon E. Maggert, one of General William E. Depuy's drafters of the 1976 manual, reinforced this notion of the Army's perception of the Soviet Union's breakthrough tactics. Major Maggert stated the following:

The active defense concept is based on the premise that a numerically superior force can be defeated on the modern battlefield, provided that the main effort can be identified early enough to permit repositioning of sufficient friendly units forward of the attack to halt its advance.<sup>4</sup>

This quote was the crux of the debate. As Major Maggert stated, the Army was developing a doctrine focusing on that single enemy's main effort that took the form of a Soviet Union's breakthrough tactic. The military society began to challenge this doctrine's premise about the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel George Steger wrote that the U.S. Army's

active defense was at a dilemma in tactics. He thought that the Soviet Union would attack across a broad front and develop multiple main efforts. The Army's dilemma revolved around the Soviet Union's emerging doctrine that was breaking away from a single massive thrust to multiprong/echeloned thrusts. General Starry recognized that without interdicting the enemy's echeloned forces, "the defender's strengths dwindle, freedom of action deteriorates and the enemy's grip on the initiative decisively tightened."<sup>5</sup> A new question was framed: Should the Army defend against a single thrust or several multiprong/echeloned thrusts? In the active defense, if the Army massed against that supposed single main attack, then the Soviet Union would have the capability and the doctrine to exploit initiatives in other sectors.<sup>6</sup> Captains Gregory Fontenot and Matthew Roberts wrote, "The presumption of both FM 100-5 [active defense] and the how-to-fight manuals that the enemy would act as predicted (mass for breakthrough, allowing U.S. forces to concentrate) was a weakness entailing no little peril."<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Union's doctrine was developing echeloned forces in both tactical and operational depth. Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, one of the AirLand Battle's lead authors, wrote in *The Defense Reform Debate*:

These commanders [US CDRs] believed that even if they could beat the leading Soviet echelons using the "active defense," the initial battles would render their units ineffective while leaving Soviet follow-on forces intact with complete freedom of action. The doctrine allowed the enemy complete freedom of maneuver beyond the line of contact because it ignored the use of operational level interdiction by Warsaw Pact follow-on echelons.<sup>8</sup>

Understanding how the Army perceived the enemy's way of fighting was critical to understanding the basic reasons for developing the active defense. Hence, the military was seriously questioning the active

defense doctrine's ability to defeat the Soviet Union's emerging doctrine. This challenge directly undermined the other issues debated in the active defense field manual.

#### Reliance on a Linear Defense

The 1976 FM 100-5 doctrine was perceived as a linear defense operation. The word "linear" has several meanings depending on the time period in which it was addressed. However, in terms of the late 1970s and mid-1980s, linear battlefield meant that the forces were predominately arrayed along a line called the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).<sup>9</sup> The reasons for this perception were several. First, as discussed earlier, the Army was predicting that the Soviet Union would incorporate only breakthrough tactics. Second, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war highlighted the technical leap in the lethality of antitank and armor warfare. Third, the political constraints dictated that the Army defend forward along Europe's eastern border. Because of these factors, the military community perceived the doctrine as predominately stressing a linear defensive operation.

#### Inadequate Offensive Initiative

Active, linear defense was perceived as the Army relinquishing the offensive initiative to the enemy. The active-defense doctrine was designed to react according to the enemy's initiative. The concept called for a covering force to determine the enemy's main effort.<sup>10</sup> While the covering force was trading space for time, the US forces would then laterally displace along the FEBA and concentrate firepower at the perceived breakthrough point.<sup>11</sup> The doctrine's reliance on defense



appeared to dismiss the advantage of offensive operations. As previously mentioned, the linear defense ignored the Soviet Union's second echelon's freedom to maintain or to gain the offensive initiative. Even disregarding the concerns of the Soviet Union's emerging multiprong/echeloned offensive doctrine, the issue questions if the U.S. should react to the enemy's initiative. Second, the lateral shifting of forces to blunt, then to destroy the enemy's main effort was considered attrition warfare. Rather than attacking the enemy's strength, the Army should attack its weakness. Also, as already highlighted, the doctrine was focused on an enemy who was no longer using breakthrough tactics. In the debated issues, active defense was characterized as a linear defense that abdicated any offensive initiative.

#### Dominance of Firepower

Part of the debated controversy over abdicating the offensive initiative centered on the firepower's dominate influence on the 1976 defensive doctrine. After the Arab-Israeli war, the technical leap in firepower gained attention. The conclusion was that because of the lethality of firepower, defensive operations would ascend in importance on the modern battlefield.<sup>12</sup> Defensive operations had the advantage of owning and selecting terrain that exploited firepower advantage. General Donn A. Starry, who later replaced General William E. Depuy as TRADOC commander, stated:

. . . we would begin a war there [Europe] defending--just by the circumstances. The defense also was an appealing problem because of the natural advantages afforded an out numbered force--especially the advantage of using terrain as a combat multiplier. We considered it essential to use terrain to beat the enemy-exploiting

his propensity to mass without regard to the ground.<sup>13</sup>

Scientific calculations were expanded on the integration of firepower, a measurable quantity, coupled with the advantage of defending from selected terrain.<sup>14</sup> This calculation later gained the name of battle calculus.<sup>15</sup> At the tactical level, the calculus concentrated on the number of Soviet Union weapon systems which could enter an engagement area. The correlation was then determined whether enough US systems (tanks, TOWs, close air support (CAS), and so on) could adequately service these targets.<sup>16</sup> From these variables of the number and type of systems along with other factors, the combat power correlation determined the number of U.S. systems required to destroy the enemy in the engagement area. The calculus was the extreme scientific approach rather than the art of fighting war. Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder and Colonel J. Clyde Tate wrote in an article for *Military Review*, "as the theme of firepower dominance developed, the rough comparison necessary to military estimates degenerated into a form of deceptively precise mathematics for staff college students, . . . ."<sup>17</sup> Firepower was a critical element in justifying the active defense. If enough units, translated into firepower, were repositioned along the active defense, the U.S. Army could halt the enemy's advance.<sup>18</sup> The doctrine also ignored the value of counterattack operations in the defense due to the innate advantages of terrain coupled with the enemy's firepower.<sup>19</sup> From the doctrine's conclusions of firepower, the active defense was implying that the defensive operations, rather than the offensive operations, were now the only viable form of battle. However, military

circles questioned the conclusion's premise that firepower would render offensive initiatives almost impotent.

#### Absence of Reserves

Because of the perceived dominance of firepower, the active defense further concluded that reserve forces had limited purpose. To solve the target-servicing problem expected at the breakthrough point, the commander could not afford to withhold a reserve.<sup>20</sup> If there was a reserve allocated, it came from division or corps and was located in-depth, astride the most likely breakthrough avenue of approach.<sup>21</sup> The primary concern was servicing targets at the breakthrough point with enough firepower. Therefore, based on the doctrine's firepower conclusions, the losses from a reserve counterattack were unacceptable. In General Donn Starry's article, "A Tactical Evolution," he said that the active defense did not favor employing reserves, "Because we believe it possible to annihilate large numbers of armored forces coming at us in mass formation, it was possible for them to do likewise unto us."<sup>22</sup> Hence, in order to maximize the unit's firepower assets to service targets at the breakthrough point, reserves were not created. Reserves were developed not as a maneuver element but rather another force astride the enemy's most likely avenue of approach. Based on the conclusions about the enemy's doctrine and the effects of firepower, the active defense's concept of reserves were passive and defensively oriented.

#### Departure from Active Defense Begins

Although there are other factors, these five debated issues were

critical in understanding the difference between the active defense and the 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine. To ensure that the army understood this comprehensive shift in ideas, battlefield organization was designed to graphically highlight and communicate these changes to the army.

First, why was battlefield organization used as the vehicle to highlight change? To respond to the five debated issues, the 1982 AirLand Battle developed the concept of battlefield organization from an existing format found in the active defense's "THE DEFENSE" chapter. The 1976 field manual's "THE DEFENSE" chapter had an existing format which illustrated and described the organization for defense. The format, "Organizing the Defense," divided the defensive sector into three areas: covering force area, main battle area, and rear area.<sup>23</sup> Since the format was already known to the officer corps, the 1982 doctrine appeared to capitalize on this familiarity to communicate its new concepts (see figure 27). Since most of the active defense was articulated in the 1976 defensive chapter, the new doctrine focused on using the concept of battlefield organization in the manual's defense chapter. Through graphic portrayal of AirLand Battle's key concepts, a soldier at a glance could grasp the difference between AirLand Battle and the active defense (see figure 28). The new manual's "THE DEFENSE" Chapter, used battlefield organization to clearly delineate the shift from the active defense to the AirLand Battle concept.

Using the five debated issues as reference points for change, battlefield organization expanded on an existing format and created five areas/elements originally called the "defensive framework":

- (1) A deep battle operation in the area of influence.

(2) A covering force operation to support the main effort.

(3) A main effort in the main battle area.

(4) Rear area combat operations (RACO).

(5) Reserve operations in support of the main effort.<sup>24</sup>

Specifically, each of the five elements in the initial development of battlefield organization articulated AirLand Battle's solution to the five debated issues discussed earlier.

The first element, deep battle was emphasized to restore offensive initiative. Rather than wait in a linear defensive posture, deep battle was used to exploit weakness rather than strengths in the Soviet Union's echeloned doctrine. The defense chapter contained the following:

Whatever type of defense is selected, the deep component of the AirLand Battle is essential to its effectiveness. It is used to affect the closure times of follow-on elements and thus create windows of opportunity for decisive action against leading enemy echelons.<sup>25</sup>

The deep battle created the conditions for the main battle area to conduct decisive operations against the lead echelon units. The element (deep battle) was designed to eliminate the Army's linear defensive thinking and to combat the enemy's multiprong/echeloned order of battle.

This offensive emphasis was further articulated in the second element, the covering force. The covering forces had their doctrinal mission changed from a defensive stance to a more offensive posture. In the active defense, the covering force's significant task was to delay the attacking enemy forces. The purpose of the delay was to gain time for the main battle area forces to laterally displace to the projected breakthrough point. However, in order to shape the AirLand Battle for

offensive operations, the new doctrine now allowed the covering force to accept decisive engagements to determine the enemy's main effort.<sup>26</sup>

The third element, the reserve force, highlighted the reemergence of reserve operations in the defense. AirLand Battle refuted the premise that fire power eliminated the reserve's ability to counterattack. Unlike the 1976 active defense, the new doctrine expected the reserves to conduct counterattacks into the enemy's weakness:

Reserves are committed to counterattacks during the defensive battle to exploit any vulnerability enemy dispositions present--exposed flanks, unprotected forces in depth, congestion, and vulnerable support units.<sup>27</sup>

The new confidence in reserve operations marked a significant shift from the old doctrine's limited approach to reserve operations.

The fourth element, the main battle area's function was redefined in terms of AirLand Battle. In the new doctrine, the Army assumed that the Soviet Union forces would penetrate the Main Battle Area in various sectors. Although the doctrine expected penetration in the Main Battle Area (MBA), this occurrence should not collapse the defense.<sup>28</sup> Second, the doctrine expected that it would use reserve forces at nearly all levels to retain the offensive initiative.<sup>29</sup> Finally, after the deep battle created the windows for success, the main battle area translated this window of opportunity into AirLand Battle's decisive phase of the operation. In the AirLand Battle, the MBA element did not abdicate the initiative nor attack the enemy's strengths.

Finally, with the acceptance that the MBA would be penetrated, the fifth element, rear battle, was redefined to counter the fluid operations expected in AirLand Battle warfare. As stated earlier, some

enemy penetrations "will pass into the corps rear area."<sup>30</sup> Rear area combat operations must be prepared to operate in fluid counter offensive operations.<sup>31</sup>

All five elements marked the departure of AirLand Battle doctrine from the active defense. Based on the existing format and the five debated issues, AirLand Battle developed these elements into a concept called battlefield organization. The 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine used the concept of battlefield organization as one of the primary tools to educate the Army on the major differences between the active defense and AirLand Battle. From its unique structure, battlefield organization could illustrate graphically, to the Army, AirLand Battle's doctrinal shift away from the active defense.

#### 1986 Battlefield Organization Purpose Expands

By the time the 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine was published, the Army's leadership had made the mental shift from the active defense to AirLand Battle doctrine. Rather than discarding battlefield organization, the 1986 doctrine expanded its functions to illustrate AirLand Battle's concepts and synchronize AirLand Battle's operations.

Instead of applying battlefield organization only in defensive operations, the concept was expanded to encompass both defensive and offensive operations (see figure 29).<sup>32</sup> In the expanded form, battlefield organization could graphically illustrate AirLand Battles offensive and defensive operations (see figures 30 and 31, respectively). Hence, with a quick glance at battlefield organization's graphical portrayal of AirLand Battles operations, the officer corps

could quickly comprehend the essential concepts unique to AirLand Battle.

In addition to functioning as a visual learning tool, battlefield organization served as a tool to synchronize the operation. In this second generation doctrine, the emergence of close, deep, and rear operations became a capstone vocabulary for battlefield organization. The earlier 1982 concepts such as reserve, main battle area, and covering forces were now considered complementary subelements of the close fight. Battlefield organization used these three concepts and subelements to reinforce the idea that the entire operation is a unified battle. The 1986 FM 100-5 stated, "Whether attacking or defending, the tactical commander fights a unified battle against the enemy's committed forces and his forces in depth and preserves his own freedom of action in the rear area."<sup>33</sup> Rather than having three independent activities--close, deep, and rear--they are interrelated. The commander "must understand the relationship among these three arenas and their combined impact on the course of the battle."<sup>34</sup> Both in the offensive and defensive chapters, battlefield organization presented a unified battle organized into the five complementary subelements.<sup>35</sup> The Corps Field Manual 100-15 stated that the battlefield organization was just one technique to synchronize the battle.<sup>36</sup> Although a slight shift in purpose, the doctrine appeared to consider battlefield organization as a tool in synchronizing the battlefield. Therefore, in every concept of the operation, battlefield organization was a tool to synchronize the units, actions, or effects residing in the various complementary subelements.



Hence, as AirLand Battle matured over time, the concept of the battlefield organization was expanded to both illustrate and synchronize AirLand Battle operations.

#### 1993 Doctrine Exceeds Battlefield Organization's Design Limits

The 1993 manual made a bold shift in redefining the purpose and character of battlefield organization. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enemy threat has changed in both composition and character. No longer was there an enemy that can unleash extremely large forces into multitheaters simultaneously. AirLand Battle was initially designed to capitalize on initiative and maneuver to offset the imbalance of forces. Now, the quantitative imbalance of enemy forces was not so pronounced. Operation Just Cause was one example of overwhelming U.S. forces implemented into a theater of operation. With the advent of the post-cold War environment, the 1993 FM 100-5 appeared to expand battlefield organization's functions beyond its designed utility.

First, the 1993 FM 100-5 expanded battlefield organization's function to synchronizing simultaneous operations. To allow simultaneous operations to occur, the 1993 doctrine emphasized the relationship of area of operation, battle space and battlefield organization.<sup>37</sup> Focusing on the third concept, battlefield organization, the synchronization of its subelements was considered key to ensuring simultaneity. "Army commanders fight deep, close, and rear actions simultaneously in a manner that appears to the enemy as one continuous operation against him. . . . Fighting within this framework thus requires constant synchronization."<sup>38</sup> In the 1993 AirLand Battle

FM 100-5, each chapter, both defense and offense, emphasized the importance of synchronizing simultaneous operations.<sup>39</sup> The key term was simultaneity. Simultaneity was the simultaneous application of combat power--throughout the depth of the battle area--that defeated the enemy rapidly.<sup>40</sup> In all future simultaneous operations, the 1993 doctrine considered battlefield organization as an integral tool for synchronizing AirLand Battle operations.

However, battlefield organization was not designed nor was it capable of supporting simultaneous operations. Deep operations no longer have the same characteristics as given in the 1982 and 1986 FM 100-5s. In the 1993 doctrine, deep battle operations have lost their distinction that separated them from MBA, main efforts, and supporting efforts. For example, how does doctrine determine deep operations in the Just Cause (Panama) operation? Striking deep in Operation Just Cause was physically not distinguishable from other efforts. In Operation Just Cause, U.S. forces were located almost throughout the depth of the operation. The traditional, deep, close, and rear were not distinguishable. If deep operations were not defined in terms of a Soviet Union modeled large force, then what determines deep operations? The 1993 FM 100-5 manual defined deep operations as follows: The new AirLand Battle's "principle targets for deep operations are the freedom of action of the opposing commander, the coherence and tempo of his actions, and the physical size of his force selected parts of it."<sup>41</sup> However, this same definition closely resembled supporting and main effort actions. The 1993 doctrine appeared to be attempting to make an old concept apply to a different set of conditions and ideas. Brigadier

General Lon Maggert, Armor School Commandant, stated that battlefield organization really has no application in today's doctrine.<sup>42</sup>

Because of the emphasis of synchronizing simultaneous operations, the doctrine appeared to use battlefield organization as the tool to develop concept of the operations. FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team*, dated 1992, proposed that the battlefield organization was the tool to develop a course of action.<sup>43</sup> Two reasons may explain why battlefield organization's function was expanded to develop concepts of the operation. First, rather than letting the battlefield organization die, it has gained a life of its own. As the conditions change and the original purposes of battlefield organization have no application, the doctrine writers have found a new application or justification for its existence. Second, in order to synchronize simultaneous operations, all the operations must be unified in effort. To unify deep, close, and rear, the 1993 doctrine implied that battlefield organization five subelements were used as the tool to develop a concept of the operation. If the battlefield organization was used to develop the concept of the operation, then all three operations, close, deep and rear were unified. However, as discussed in chapter three, this logic was not valid. At a minimum, the concept of the operation must have a decisive point to theoretically focus all efforts and operations. Since battlefield organization did not address nor was it designed to address the decisive point, the concept was not capable of developing an effective concept of the operation.

### Summary

Battlefield organization's original function was to specifically highlight the AirLand Battle's conceptual departure from the active defense. With the subsequent publication of the 1986 AirLand Battle, the concept was expanded to include all operations, not just defense. In the 1986 doctrine, it was primarily a tool to continually educate the Army on AirLand Battle's fundamental concepts. However, following Just Cause and with the publication of the 1993 AirLand Battle doctrine, battlefield organization expanded beyond its designed purpose and utility. Although not recognized, when doctrine proposed simultaneous operations, it signal the demise of battlefield organization. The new doctrine even published that "during the conduct of operations, the lines of distinction among these three activities [deep, close, and rear] tend to blur."<sup>44</sup> Since the distinctions were blurred and almost indistinguishable, the battlefield organization has essentially outlived its utility. Rather than retiring the concept, doctrine appeared to use battlefield organization as a tool to develop concept of the operation that can achieve synchronous simultaneity on the battlefield. Again, battlefield organization was never designed to develop concepts of the operation. In its course of development, battlefield organization was never structured to define the theoretical focus point for a concept of the operation. Lacking the ability to focus a concept of the operation, doctrine has exceed battlefield organization's designed intent.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Major Paul H. Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," Combat Studies Institutes, Leavenworth Papers, no. 16 (U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth: July 1988), 98.

<sup>2</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 July 1976), 5-2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 5-3.

<sup>4</sup>Major Lon E. Maggert, "An Analytical Approach to Terrain Analysis and Allocation of Combat Power," Military Review 58, no. 4 (April 1978): 34.

<sup>5</sup>General Donn A. Starry, "Extending the Battlefield," Military Review 61, no. 3 (March 1981), 44.

<sup>6</sup>Lieutenant Colonel George F. Steger, "More Dilemmas in Studying Soviet Tactics," Military Review 58, no. 2 (February 1978): 89.

<sup>7</sup>Captain Gregory Fontenot and Captain Matthew D. Roberts, "Plugging Holes and Mending Fences," Infantry, (May-June 1978): 32-36, quoted in John L. Romjue, "From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982," TRADOC Historical Monograph Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), 16.

<sup>8</sup>Brigadier General Huba Wass De Czege, "Army Doctrinal Reform," The Defense Reform Debate, edited Asa A. Clark IV, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and James W. Reed (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 106.

<sup>9</sup>COL Clyde J. Tate and LTC L. D. Holder, "New Doctrine for the Defense," Military Review 61, no. 3 (March 1981): 3.

<sup>10</sup>FM 100-5, 1976, 5-10.

<sup>11</sup>FM 100-5, 1976, 5-3, 5-10, 5-11.

<sup>12</sup>Tate and Holder, 4.

<sup>13</sup>General Donn A. Starry, "A Tactical Evolution--FM 100-5," Military Review 58, no. 8, (August 1978): 6, 7.

<sup>14</sup>Maggert, 42-45 and Wass De Czege, 116.

<sup>15</sup>Romjue, 23-24.

<sup>16</sup>John J. Romjue, "From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series (Fort Monroe: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 24.

<sup>17</sup>Tate and Holder, 4.

<sup>18</sup>Maggert, 34.

<sup>19</sup>FM 100-5, 1976, 5-14.

<sup>20</sup>Starry, 9.

<sup>21</sup>Maggert, 42.

<sup>22</sup>Starry, 9.

<sup>23</sup>FM 100-5, 1976, 5-10.

<sup>24</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 January 1982), 10-2.

<sup>25</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-6.

<sup>26</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-8.

<sup>27</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-19.

<sup>28</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-15.

<sup>29</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-17.

<sup>30</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-15.

<sup>31</sup>FM 100-5, 1982, 10-16.

<sup>32</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 May 1986), 35, 36.

<sup>33</sup>FM 100-5, 1986, 36.

<sup>34</sup>FM 100-5, 1986, 19.

<sup>35</sup>FM 100-5, 1986, 106, 137.

<sup>36</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1989), 5-10, 5-13, 6-3.

<sup>37</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 6-12.

<sup>38</sup>FM 100-5 1993, 6-13.

<sup>39</sup>FM 100-5, 1993 7-12, 9-4.

<sup>40</sup>FM 100-5, 1993, 6-12.

<sup>41</sup>FM 100-5, 1993, 6-14.

<sup>42</sup>Brigadier General Lon E. Maggert, Commanding General, U.S. Armor Center and Fort Knox, "Focused Dispatch," Armor School's Force XXI discussion, Eisenhower Hall, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 9 November 1995. During Brigadier General Maggert's lecture to the CGSC class

on the status of Force XXI from the armor school's perspective. He stated to the effect that the concepts close, deep, and rear have no real value or purpose in our current doctrine.

<sup>43</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company Team (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 Sept 1992), 1-28-1-30.

<sup>44</sup>FM 100-5, 1993, 7-12

## CHAPTER 5

### RESEARCH DESIGN

The study obtained four OPORD scenarios from the Army's three Combat Training Centers. Two survey groups read the scenarios. Based on the two survey groups' level of understanding, the research evaluated each OPORD's concept of the operation for conciseness, clarity, and purposefulness. From the results, the study made conclusions on the effectiveness of each concept of the operation. Using the same survey groups, the research evaluated the effectiveness of the same concept of the operations in terms of battlefield organization. The research compared these two evaluations and developed conclusions relevant to the research question. The research question for this thesis was as follows: For combat arms at brigade level and below, does the use of battlefield organization degrade the concept of operation's effectiveness in accomplishing the mission? To achieve this analysis, the research was designed in five major blocks: OPORD selection, survey group, survey package, survey questionnaire, and data methodology.

#### Operation Order Selection

The study used training missions conducted at three Combat Training Center's (CTCs) to represent a typical combat unit's concept of the operation. There are three CTCs: the National Training Center



(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk; Louisiana, and the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. In each CTC, the units at brigade and/or battalion level conducted combat operations against Soviet-modeled opposing forces. The units were placed under near combat conditions with all the variables and forces realistically affecting the development and execution of the OPORD. The difference between the CTCs and local training areas were vast. The units' local training areas on installations were unable to develop conditions which accurately replicate combat operations. Second, on-post training invariably splits the unit's focus in conducting a tactical mission while simultaneously handling garrison administrative requirements. Because of the unique training environments, the CTC combat training exercises drew out the unit's best performance. Under these conditions, the unit's concepts of the operation developed at the CTC should represent the Army's best in warfighting skills.

The research narrowed the study to combined-arms brigade and battalion units. Much of the data above brigade level was limited in availability. Within the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Combined Training Center Archive (CTC Archive) is the primary repository for all unit operations conducted at the three CTCs. The CTC Archive had a sufficient amount of data to allow the study to analyze four brigade--and/or battalion level--operations.

Because of the limited sample of four operations, the study could only infer conclusions. To ensure a 95 percent level of confidence in results, the study required a sample selection of

approximately 66 battalion/brigade operations.<sup>1</sup> With the limited sample of operation, the research could only provide insight and infer conclusions toward the thesis question.

The selection of the OPORDs was a random process within the established set of criteria below:

1. The time period when the OPORD was published must range from 1992 to 1995. (Note, the time period from 1992 to present best represented the Army's current character since the end of the Gulf War. Any OPORD selected prior to that time may be influenced with the robust nature of the Army, preparation of the Gulf War, and down sizing of military forces of the 1980s).

2. The Opposing Force's graphic, order of battle, and OPORD must be available.

3. The unit's OPORD must be complete, containing, at a minimum, the following:

- (a) Area of interest (friendly unit disposition)
- (b) Mission statement
- (c) Concept of the operation
- (d) Operation's graphics
- (e) Task organization
- (f) Commander's intent statement (optional)

4. The higher unit's mission must be available.

5. The collected material must be legible in order to read and comprehend the order.

6. The OPORD was confined to one type of mission.

7. At least one OPORD must be a movement-to-contact operation.

8. At least one OPORD must be a deliberate-attack operation.
9. At least one OPORD must be a defensive operation.
10. At least one OPORD must be at brigade level.
11. At least one OPORD must be at battalion level.

The records submitted from the CTCs for storage at the CTC Archive were not uniform and were sporadic in consistency. Based on this inconsistency of available data, the research found four operations which met the criteria. The four operations selected were listed as follows:

1. An armor task force composed of three armor companies and one mechanized company conducted a deliberate-attack operation at the NTC, Rotation 92-05, 18 February 1992.<sup>2</sup>
2. A mechanized task force composed of three mechanized companies and two armored companies conducted a defensive operation at the CMTC, Rotation 92-05, 21 April 1992.<sup>3</sup>
3. A brigade combat team composed of one armored Task Force and one light Infantry Task Force conducted a movement-to-contact operation at the NTC, Rotation 93-04, 10 January 1993.<sup>4</sup>
4. An airborne task force composed of four light infantry companies, five antitank platoons, and a mechanized platoon conducted a deliberate-attack operation at the JRTC, Rotation 93-08 7 September, 1993.<sup>5</sup>

#### Survey Group

The survey group consisted of experienced and tactically-competent officers. The officers selected were limited to armor, infantry, and aviation combat arms branch. To ensure maximum experience

and focus, combat-support and combat-service-support officers were not eligible. Each officer had previous assignments as commanders, executive officers, and/or operation officers in armor, infantry, or attack-helicopter battalions or brigade-sized units. To add maturity to the survey group's experience, the officer must be at a rank of major or above. Since they had served in one of the prescribed roles mentioned, the Army rated these officers as branch qualified. Branch qualified implied that each officer has had direct experience in the developing and executing OPORDs similar to the four selected OPORDs. With their background of experience and branch qualification, the survey group was qualified to examine and to understand a typical OPORD.

The survey group came from a pool of officers located in the Combined Arms Staff Study School faculty, the Precommand Command Course (PCC) faculty, and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) observer-controllers. All three organizations were located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Other than meeting the specific eligibility requirements, the study accepted all officers willing to participate in the survey.

The survey group was divided into two distinct groups. One group received a survey package composed of two selected OPORD concepts of operation: Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. The study labeled the group as survey group 12. The other group received a survey package composed of a different set of OPORD concepts of the operation: Scenario A and Scenario B. The study labeled this group as survey group AB. Each individual within his respective survey groups examined his assigned scenarios and answered the structured survey questionnaire within an allotted two week-period.

### Survey Package

To limit any skew in the analysis, the survey had to be easily understood to retain the control group's undivided attention. First, the officers in the survey group took their personal time and effort to conduct the survey. Second, time was a limited commodity. If the survey was too long and complex, the assumption was that the survey group's quality of analysis and their response would proportionally degrade. Based on preliminary practice with five subjects acting as a survey group, each officer was limited to only two of the four OPORDs. (If expected to examine more than two OPORDs, the individual's ability to provide quality analysis will drop). As a result, the four selected OPORDs were packaged into two groups. Survey package 12 grouped the brigade combat team's movement-to-contact OPORD with the mechanized task force's deliberate-defense OPORDs. The brigade combat team and the mechanized task forces OPORDs were listed as scenario 1 and 2, respectively. (See Survey Packets, appendix A.) Survey package AB grouped the airborne task force's deliberate-attack OPORD with the armored task force's deliberate-attack OPORD. The airborne task force and the armored task force OPORDS were listed as scenario A and B respectively. (See Survey Packets, appendix A.)

In each survey packet, the scenarios contained the following information:

Page 1: Scenario number, type of operation, and size and type of unit.

Page 2: Sketch of the area of interest depicting the units area of operations, friendly units, enemy order of battle, enemy's

disposition, and enemy's mission, and finally important terrain features.

Page 3: Unit task organization, higher unit's mission statement, higher unit's intent (if available), unit mission statement, and unit concept of the operation (word-for-word).

Page 4: Topography map 1:50,000, operation graphics of unit, operations graphics of enemy, decision graphics depicting units (enemy or friendly) on the appropriate graphics.

Page 5: Survey consisting of three to four pages of questions tailored for each scenario.

The survey group was provided the same products issued from the original publication of the OPORD. The only exception was the situational template (SITE MP). Three scenarios used the Opposing Force (OPFOR) graphics, and one scenario used the OPORD's graphics. During the research, the SITE MP's for the operations were unavailable or were too vague to provide any information on the capabilities of the opposing force. Consequently, if the SITE MP was missing or too vague, the opposing graphics were used to provide the control group a true appreciation of the enemy's capabilities.

With each package, the goal was to provide a standard format containing only essential information. If the information was presented uniformly for both OPORDS, familiarity with the format will extend each respondent's attention span. From the original OPORDs, information was translated verbatim into the scenario packages. Irrelevant information was omitted to prevent the survey group from stagnating in a mass of disinformation. Irrelevant information usually consisted of command and

control instructions, routine procedures, nongermane graphics, and numerous contingency plans not applicable to the operation. Hence, the scenarios presented the essential elements of information in a format easily understood by the survey groups. The survey scenarios streamlined presentation of the concept of the operation allowed the survey groups quickly to focus and to render conclusions in the survey questionnaire. For the sake of maintaining uniformity within the survey group's perspective, the OPORDs were grouped together according to format rather than content.

The research allowed each officer in the survey groups to read and to answer his survey packages at his own pace. Other than the instructions in the survey package, the research provided no other explanations or guidance.

#### Survey Questionnaire

The survey was originally designed to provide two specific approaches toward analyzing the research question.

Approach Method 1: Using a survey group, the research measured how effectively the concept of the operation communicated the commander's decisive point to the survey group. The research also measured how the survey groups used battlefield organization to assess the same concepts of the operation. The research then compared the two findings and rendered conclusions.

Approach Method 2: The research intended to use the survey group as the unbiased evaluators of the concept of the operation. The survey group was to make subjective analysis of the concept of the operation's decisive point and battlefield organization. Based on their

analysis, the research would collate their responses and render conclusions. This approach would capitalize on an unbiased analysis of the four concepts of operation.

Because of the lack of a sufficient number of qualified officers to take the survey, Approach Method 2 could not support any conclusions. In addition, Approach Method 2 was too dependent on each officer's tactical skills. The variance in tactical skills between the officers within the survey group could have skewed the research data. Consequently, in the survey, some of the questions linked to Approach Method 2 no longer have any use. However, Approach Method 1 did contain sufficient number of officers to establish reliable conclusions.

Because of the difference between each scenario, it was not feasible to develop a generic survey. In order to render some insightful responses, the survey had to tailor the questions to each scenario. For commonality, each scenario followed a similar outline.

1. One standard question asked where the survey group personally thought the decisive point should be.
2. Two standard questions asked the survey groups if each of the concepts of operation clearly defined the commander's decisive point.
3. Three standard questions asked about battlefield organization.

Based on the responses, some questions were not valid due to a variety of misinterpretation of the specific question. Some questions were used as quality control to ensure that the officers in the survey group carefully studied the scenario packages. Finally, after the research discarded research Approach Method 2, some of the questions were no



longer applicable. Based on these reasons, the survey groups answers to the following questions were discarded.

Scenario 1 Questions 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, & 18.

Scenario 2 Questions 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, & 17.

Scenario A Questions 4, 5, 8, 10, & 11.

Scenario B Questions 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15

Each question had either a single or multiple responses. In order to eliminate as many variables in the responses, the survey group responded according to a prescribed answer matrix. The answer matrix was composed of six graduated answers: (1) not applicable [n/a], (2) no [n], (3) no with qualifiers [no/qf], (4) neutral [neu], (5) yes with qualifiers [yes/qf], and (6) yes [y]. From these specific answers, the research was able to quantitatively measure the responses for each question.

#### Data Methodology

Determining the Concept of the Operations Effectiveness. An effective concept of the operation sets the conditions for units to win battles. The unit's success or failure in battle did not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of the concept of the operation. Many variables outside the commander's influence could also effect the outcome of the battle. A conclusion stemming solely from the outcomes of a battle may skew the analysis. The variables which impact the battle outcomes were both numerous and unmeasurable. Clausewitz's concepts of "fog" and "friction" contained a variety of these variables. Even with an effective concept of the operation, the variables which reside in the fog and friction of war could influence the battle's

outcome. Based on the risk of drawing erroneous conclusions, this research did not use battle results to measure the concept of the operation's effectiveness.

Instead, the research used two survey groups as the yardstick to measure the effectiveness of the concept of the operation. The two survey groups were survey group 12 composed of ten officers and survey group AB composed of seven officers. The survey groups' view points represented elements of a typical battalion or brigade orders group. By this research's definition the orders group in a battalion, would consist of all the company commanders, the battalion operations officer, the battalion executive officer, and the battalion commander. In a brigade unit, the orders group would consist of all the battalion commanders, the brigade operations officer, the brigade executive officer, and the brigade commander. In any OPORD, the commander expects the concept of the operation to convey a clear, concise and purposeful focus to his orders group. Based on the survey group's level of understanding of the order, the research measured quantitatively the concept of the operation's effectiveness.

For each scenario examined, the research demonstrated that each survey group required a concept of the operation to focus its efforts. The study verified the survey groups' disparate view points in accomplishing the mission. To verify this tendency for disparate view points, the research posed the following survey question:

1. Based on the unit's mission, unit's task organization, enemy's probable COA, and terrain, where do you (surveyee) think the


decisive point should be?

Pt 1   Pt 2   Pt 3   Pt 4   Pt 5   Pt 6   Pt 7   Pt 8 . . .

\_\_\_\_\_

As shown, the survey groups were provided a selection of possible points relevant to each scenario's operation. To ensure that the list was all encompassing, the survey categorized the last point as "other." The respondents used the answer matrix to quantify their response. All responses with (yes) and (yes with qualifiers) were collapsed into a "yes" category. With this response data, the survey groups' disparity level was illustrated on a histogram. Figure 1 was an example of a Decisive Point Disparity Spread histogram. The Y-axis was the range of officers in that survey group. The X-axis listed all the possible points. In this example, there were thirteen possible points

**FIG. 1. Scenario Example**



for this concept of the operation. Each bar in the histogram

represented the number of officers within the survey group which selected that specific point. Note, that eight officers out of ten selected point number 5 as the most decisive point for this situation.

For all the survey questions, the research developed three criteria to measure the responses:

Criteria 1. For survey group 12, eight out of ten officers must agree on the same decisive point. Less than eight officers means that the group did not have a common focus. For survey group AB, five out of seven officers must agree on the same decisive point. Less than five officers means that the group did not have a common focus.


Criteria 2. For survey group 12, if eight officers selected one point, then the remaining other points selected must not exceed a total of two officers. For survey group AB, if five officers selected one point, then the remaining other points selected must not exceed a total of two officers. Example, some of the officers in the survey groups have selected more than one decisive point for the scenario. Figure 2 was a good example of officers within the survey group selecting more than one decisive point for the given scenario.

Criteria 3. For both survey groups, unless criteria 2 was met, only one decisive point was selected.

For question 1, if all three criteria were met, then the survey group has a common focus on where they determined the decisive point should be for this mission's situation. Example, figure 1 was an example of a histogram depicting survey group 12 satisfying the three criteria for the depicted scenario example. In this example, eight officers picked one point and the two other officers picked their own

separate points. Although this example depicted the group selecting three decisive points, all three criteria were satisfied. Therefore, survey group 12 shared a common focus for figure 1's scenario example. However, in figure 2, the second example, survey group 12 did not satisfy all three criteria for this second example's scenario. Criteria 1 was satisfied. Criteria 2 was not satisfied. In fact, the group had almost a split focus between point number 6 and point number 10.

**FIG. 2. SCENARIO 2nd Example**



The answers to question 1 achieved two purposes. First, it should verify that each group did not naturally share a common decisive point. Second, it should verify that the survey groups did represent a typical orders group that exhibited wide, disparate points of view. Without an effective concept of the operation to communicate a common decisive point, the research illustrated that a typical unit inherently contained multiple viewpoints lacking focus in accomplishing the mission.

After verifying the group's disparity results, the research analyzes the concept of the operation's effectiveness in communicating a clear, concise, and purposeful order to the survey groups. Each survey group was allowed to examine the concepts of the operation in detail. As discussed in chapter 3, a concept of the operation must communicate three essential points: the commander's decisive point, the purpose of the main and supporting efforts, and the interrelationships between the main and supporting efforts. The research focused on measuring the concept of the operation's effectiveness in communicating the commander's decisive point. If the concept of the operation was unable to communicate a common decisive point, then the concept of the operation was ineffective. The research developed survey questions 2 and 3 to measure the concept of the operation's communication of the decisive point.

2. Although the commander may have not verbalized it, did the commander select a decisive point in his concept of the operation?

All responses with (yes) and (yes with qualifiers) were collapsed into a "yes" category. All responses with (no) and (no with qualifiers) were collapsed into a "no" category. Figure 3 was a notional example for displaying the data.

Figure 3. Initial Understanding of Commander's Decisive Point

Number of officers that said Yes	<u>7</u>
Number of Officers that said No	<u>2</u>
Number of officers that said Neutral	<u>0</u>
Number of officers with blank response	<u>1</u>
Total responses	<u>10</u>

The research used criteria 1 for question 2. For survey group 12, the level of understanding must have eight out of ten officers agreeing on the same decisive point. For survey group AB, the level of understanding must have five out of seven officers agreeing on the same decisive point. If criteria 1 was not achieved, then the concept of the operation was not effective.

3. Based on his concept of the operation, where do you (officer in survey group) think the commander selected his decisive point at?


Pt 1   Pt 2   Pt 3   Pt 4   Pt 5   Pt 6 . . .

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Again, the response data from this question was based on the answer matrix. The specific categories for collapsing the data has changed slightly. All responses with (yes) and (yes with qualifiers) were collapsed into a "yes" category. However, all responses with (no), (no with qualifiers), and (blank responses) were collapsed into a "no" category. Based on the character and structure of the question, the research assumed that a blank response equated to a "no" response. The survey groups attempted to identify the commander's decisive points from a specific number of potential points. The last point was categorized as "other". The survey group's level of understanding of the commander's decisive point are depicted on a histogram. Figure 4 is a notional example of the histogram.

**FIG. 4. Scenario Notional**

**Understanding the CDR'S Decisive Point**



For question 3, in order for the concept of the operation to be effective, all three criteria must be satisfied. Criteria (1, 2, 3) determines whether the officers in the survey group clearly understand the concept of the operation's decisive point. If the criteria were not satisfied, then the concept of the operation was not clear, concise, and purposeful. If it was not clear, concise and purposeful, then the concept of the operation was not effective in accomplishing the mission. Therefore, by measuring the survey group's understanding of this essential point, the research drew conclusions on each concept of the operation's effectiveness in accomplishing the mission.

Battlefield Organization  
Relation to the Concept of the Operation

The study examined three factors. First, the study measured the survey group's battlefield organization assessment for each concept of the operation. Secondly, the study measured the survey groups'



identification of the four elements of battlefield organization within the concept of the operation. Finally, in terms of battlefield organization, the study measured the survey group's perception of the main and supporting efforts interrelationship within the concept of the operation. These measurements provided conclusions and insights relevant to the research question.

Theoretically, the survey group's battlefield organization assessment of the concept of the operation should correlate with the study's established conclusions. The study measured the survey group's battlefield organization assessment with the following survey question:

4. Do the units in each element of the battlefield organization (security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting effort, and reserve) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment?

Since brigade and battalion units were not resourced to conducting deep and rear operations, these two areas of battlefield organization were not considered. The study only focused on the four elements contained in the close fight: security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting effort, and reserve. Again, the positive answers were collapsed to a "yes" category. Criteria 1 was used to determine the level of assessment for each battlefield organization element in the concept of the operation. Based on the survey groups' responses for each element, the study compared the results to the research's established conclusions on the concept of the operation's effectiveness. The research then made definitive conclusions on battlefield organization's effects on the concept of the operation's effectiveness in accomplishing the mission.

To provide more insight into these definitive conclusions, the research measured the survey group's perception of how distinctive the four elements of battlefield organization were evident in the concept of the operation. The following survey question was posed to measure the structure's level of distinction:

5. Does the commander's concept of operation appear to have a doctrinal battlefield organization for security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve?

The positive answers were collapsed to a "yes" category. Based on the survey group's measured perceptions, the research then compared battlefield organization structure's level of distinction to battlefield organization's assessment of the concept of the operation. The study compared the raw positive answers for each element in the battlefield organization. The comparison provided insight into why the battlefield organization affects the concept of the operation.

Finally, the study measured the survey group's understanding of the main and supporting efforts interrelationship within the concept of the operation. The survey question was posed:

6. For each unit, identify whether the unit fits into the elements of battlefield organization: security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting effort, and reserve?

As in the other previous questions, the positive answers were collapsed into the "yes" category. After the survey group placed the applicable units into the battlefield organization structure, the study measured how distinctive the main and supporting efforts were. If the main and supporting efforts were not distinguishable from each other, then,

theoretically, battlefield organization assessment should indicate that the concept of the operation was ineffective. The study drew conclusions on this theoretical relationship. These conclusions provided additional insight on why and how battlefield organization assess the concept of the operation's effectiveness.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Stephen Isaac and William B. Michael, Handbook in Research and Evaluation, 2d ed. (San Diego: Edits Publisher, 1981), 192-193.

<sup>2</sup>"Armor Task Force's Deliberate Night Attack," National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 92-05, 18 February 1992, Combined Training Centers Archive, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

<sup>3</sup>"Mechanized Task Force's Deliberate Defense," Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) Rotation 92-05, 21 April 1992, Combined Training Center Archive, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

<sup>4</sup>"Brigade Heavy/Light Combat Team's Movement to Contact," NTC, Rotation 93-04, 10 January 1993, Combined Training Center Archive, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

<sup>5</sup>"First Airborne Task Force Deliberate Attack," Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Rotation 93-08, 7 September 1993, Combined Training Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

## CHAPTER 6

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

The analysis determined five findings. First, the study confirmed that if a decisive point was not picked for them, then the officers in the survey groups will develop their own decisive point. Second, three of the concept of the operation's were ineffective. One of the concepts of the operation was marginally effective. Third, the survey group's battlefield organization assessments of the concept of the operation did not correlate with the research's findings. Fourth, as the survey group could better identify the four elements of battlefield organization within the concept of the operation, their assessment of the concept was positive. Finally, the survey group appeared to use battlefield organization's main and supporting efforts to reinforce error in battlefield organization assessments.

#### Analysis

Review of Chapter 5's Criteria. Chapter 5 listed three criteria:

Criteria 1. For survey group 12, eight out of ten officers must agree on the same point or element. Less than eight officers meant that the group did not have a common focus or assessment. For survey group AB, five out of seven officers must agree on the same point or element.

Less than five officers meant that the group did not have a common focus or assessment.

Criteria 2. For survey group 12, if eight officers selected one point, then the remaining other points selected must not exceed a total of two officers. For survey group AB, if five officers selected one point, then the remaining other points selected must not exceed a total of two officers.

Criteria 3. For both survey groups, unless criteria 2 was met, only one common point was selected.


Survey Group's Focus. The analysis confirmed that a decisive point was necessary to focus the survey group. If someone did not define the decisive point, then officers in the survey group will individually develop their own separate decisive points. Given survey group 12 and AB, the following question was posed:

1: Based on the unit's mission, unit's organization, enemy's probable

COA, and terrain, where do you think the decisive point should be?

The responses for all four scenarios were illustrated on histograms labeled figure 5, Scenario 1; figure 15, Scenario 2; figure 16, Scenario A; and figure 17, Scenario B. Histogram (figure 5) showed that criteria 1, 2, and 3 were not satisfied. The survey group was unable to achieve the requirement of eight out of ten officers agree on the same point. Additionally, survey group 12 selected seven different decisive points. For scenario 1's situation, the officers in survey group 12 exhibited the natural tendency to have different opinions in accomplishing the mission.

**FIG. 5. SCENARIO 1**



Without an effective concept of the operation in scenario 1 to focus survey group 12, this group was not capable collectively to generate or to concentrate combat power decisively. In all the other scenarios, figures 15, 16, and 17, the histograms illustrated the same results (see appendix B). First, the research validated that the survey group responses represented a typical orders group. Second, the research validates that what was decisive for one individual was not necessarily decisive for another. Therefore, in order to align the group toward one decisive point, it was necessary for the commander to communicate his decisive point.

Determining Concept of the Operations Effectiveness. The research determined that three concepts of operation were ineffective and one was marginally effective in accomplishing the mission. For each scenario, the research posed a second question:

2. Although the commander may have not verbalized it, did the commander select a decisive point in his concept of operation?

For all four scenarios, the responses were displayed in figure 6.

Figure 6. Initial Understanding of the Commander's Decisive Point

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2
Number of officers that said Yes	<u>5</u>	<u>8</u>
Number of Officers that said No	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
Number of officers that said Neutral	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Number of officers with blank response	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total responses	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>

	Scenario A	Scenario B
Number of officers that said Yes	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>
Number of Officers that said No	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
Number of officers that said Neutral	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Number of officers with blank response	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Total responses	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>


Scenarios 2 and B both satisfy criteria 1. Scenarios 1 and B did not satisfy criteria 1. In the research's preliminary findings, scenario 2 and A's concept of the operation initially appeared to be effective. However, the other remaining two concepts of the operation appeared to be ineffective.

From these preliminary results, the research further analyzed the survey groups' level of understanding of the commander's decisive point.



3. Based on his concept of operation, where do you think the commander selected his decisive point?

The survey group's common understanding of the commander's decisive point was depicted on a histogram for each scenario. Figure 7 illustrated survey group AB's response to scenario A's concept of the operation.




In figure 7, Scenario A, criteria 1 was satisfied. Five out of seven officers agreed on the same point (point 1). However, criteria 2 and 3 was not satisfied. Although five officers agreed on point 1, the remaining points exceed the two officer limit. This exceeding the limit means that at least two officers made more than one choice. In the case of those officers, the concept of the operation was not effective in communicating the commander's decisive point. In all four scenarios, the concepts of the operation never stated what the decisive point was

or where it was located. In each case, the survey group had to infer where the commander had determined his decisive point for the operation. With criteria 2 not achieved, it then follows that criteria 3 was not met as well. The survey group collectively selected four decisive points rather than one needed to indicate an effective concept. Based on the selected point spread and predominance of Point number 1, this concept of the operation were marginally ineffective in communicating the commander's decisive point. Unlike scenario A, the other three concepts of the operation were definitely ineffective in communicating the commander's decisive point. Figure 8, Scenario 2, illustrated these findings.

**FIG. 8. SCENARIO 2**

Understanding the CDR'S Decisive Point



In scenario 2, all three criteria were not satisfied: Criteria 1, the survey group was unable to achieve eight out of ten officer to agree on one point. Criteria 2, the survey group indicated 36 selections which

exceeded the total available officers by 26. Criteria 3, the survey group selected a total of 10 possible decisive points. In this scenario, the concept of the operation was unable to communicate one common decisive point to the survey group. The concept of the operation in scenario 2 was ineffective in accomplishing the mission. Scenario 1 and Scenario B displayed similar findings (see figures 18 and 19 in appendix B).


From the findings established from both questions, the research concluded that scenario A's concept of the operation was marginally effective in communicating the commander's decisive point. Therefore, scenario A's concept of the operation was marginally effective in accomplishing the mission. Furthermore, the research concluded that the other three concepts of the operation were all ineffective in accomplishing the mission. As a note, unlike the other scenario commanders, the commander for scenario A specifically stated his decisive point in his concept of the operation. The other three commander's concept of the operations forced their subordinate units to infer where the commander's decisive point.

Battlefield Organization Assessment of Concept of the operation's effectiveness. Battlefield organization assessments did not correlate with the research conclusions on the concepts of the operation that were determined ineffective. By asking question 4, the study measured the survey group's battlefield organization's assessment.

4. Do the units in each element of the battlefield organization (security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting effort, and reserve) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment?

To measure the correlation, the study used criteria 1. If the concept of the operation was determined effective, then battlefield organization should theoretically agree. Therefore, for survey group 12, each element should receive eight officers or more agreeing that the element assisted the main effort. For survey group AB, each element should receive five officers or more agreeing that the element assists the main effort. If the research determined the concept of the operation ineffective, then the number of positive responses should reflect the opposite. The responses for all four scenarios were illustrated on histograms labeled figure 9, Scenario 1; figure 20, Scenario 2; figure 21, Scenario B; and figure 10, Scenario A. Figure 9, Scenario 1, is displayed as follows:

**FIG. 9. SCENARIO 1**




For each element in figure 9, the bar graph indicated a positive assessment that the concept of the operation was effective. But since the research earlier concluded that scenario 1's concept of the

operation was ineffective, then the assessments should indicate the same. In figure 9, all four elements failed criteria 1. Theoretically, all four elements should have received two or less positive responses. The research found that the survey group's battlefield organization assessment did not match with the research's earlier findings that Scenario 1 concept of the operation was ineffective. Scenario 2 and B histograms displayed the same findings. In scenario 2 (figure 20, appendix B), the results were not so well defined but still indicate that the assessment did not agree with the research's findings. In scenario B, (figure 21, appendix B) with the exception of the reserve element, all the results distinctively failed criteria 1. One out of four elements did not negate the findings. Second, the study considered the main and supporting efforts as the more important elements of battlefield organization.

In contrast, survey group AB's battlefield assessment of

**FIG. 10. SCENARIO A**



scenario A's concept of the operation did marginally correlate with the research findings. Two of the four elements, the main and supporting effort, correlated with the findings. The other two elements, security/reconnaissance and the reserve did not correlate. Figure 10, Scenario A, displayed the histogram data.


When the concepts of the operation were ineffective, the research found that the survey group's battlefield assessments did not correlate with the results. In all four scenario's, regardless of effectiveness of the concept of the operation, battlefield organization assessed the four scenario's as "effective" to "neutral." Therefore, the research concluded that battlefield organization was not capable of assessing the operation's effectiveness.

To provide more insight into why there was no correlation, the research measured the survey group's identification of the four elements of battlefield organization within the concept of the operation. The research determined that if the concept of the operation conformed to the pattern of battlefield organization, then the survey groups would assess the concepts of the operation would be effective. The following question was asked:

5. Does the commander's concept of the operation appear to have a doctrinal battlefield organization for security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve?

In all the scenarios, as the survey groups could more easily identify the four elements of battlefield organization, the survey group proportionally assessed the concept of the operation as "effective." Figure 11 displayed the proportional relationship for scenario 2.

## FIG. 11. SCENARIO 2



For each element, as the group more easily identified the patterns of battlefield organization within the concept of the operation, the survey group then assessed more positively that the concept of the operation was effective. With the exception of one deviant assessment of the reserves in Scenario 1, all four survey groups had the same results. Figure 22, Scenario 1; figure 23, Scenario A; and figure 24, Scenario B, were displayed in appendix B. Research concluded the following:

Regardless how effective the concept of the operation was, the more distinguishable the pattern of battlefield organization was in the concept of the operation, the more the survey group proportionally believed that the concept of the operation was effective in accomplishing the mission.

Finally, the study determined that battlefield organization identification of main and supporting efforts reinforced the error in

assessing the effectiveness of the operation. The research asked the following question:

6. For each unit, identify whether the unit fits into the elements of battlefield organization: security/reconnaissance, main effort, supporting effort, and reserve?


If the main and supporting efforts were not distinguishable from each other, then battlefield organization theoretically should indicate that the concept of the operation was ineffective. Reference from chapter 3, the third essential point in a concept of operation was understanding the interrelations between the main and supporting efforts toward achieving the decisive point. Figure 12 displayed the interrelationships between the main and supporting efforts for scenario 1's concept of the operation. In figure 12, the research found that there was no clear distinction between the main and supporting effort. The armor and light infantry task forces show different assessments. Out of ten officers, nine officers stated the armor was the main effort. However, five officers out of the same ten indicated that armor task force was the supporting effort. In this scenario, the lack of understanding of the main and supporting efforts interrelationship matched the research's earlier finding that the concept of the operation was ineffective. However, even with the survey group conducting their own analysis, the survey group still assessed the concept of the operation as "effective." Figure 25, Scenario 2, and figure 26, Scenario B, displayed similar findings (see appendix B). Figure 13, Scenario A, reinforced the findings. In figure 13, Scenario A, survey



group AB clearly identified a distinct main effort and two supporting efforts.


**FIG. 12. SCENARIO 1**

Main & Sping Efforts Interrelationship



**FIG. 13. SCENARIO A**

Main & Sping Efforts Interrelationship



Although two officers deviated from the majority of the group, the deviation was within criteria 1's allowable tolerance. Consequently, the survey group indicated a clear main and supporting effort interrelationship which correlated with the research's conclusion that scenario A was marginally effective.

The research concluded that the survey group used the elements of battlefield organization to reinforce error in assessing the effectiveness of a concept of the operation. Regardless of whether or not there was a good interrelationship between the main and supporting efforts, if the survey group could identify units that fit the main and supporting effort pattern, then they considered the concept of the operation as "effective."

Conclusion. Battlefield organization was not capable of assessing a concept of the operation's effectiveness. If an orders group or officer used battlefield organization to examine a concept of the operation, it could cause false conclusions on the concept of the operation's effectiveness.

## CHAPTER 7

### COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE INFLUENCE

One of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's (CGSC) missions was to educate the attending officers in the conduct of military operations. Based on what was taught at the college, the graduate officers will then teach these same concepts in the Army. CGSC's Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) was the primary department responsible for teaching the fundamentals of combat operations. Because of CTAC's method of instruction, CGSC was training the officer corps to use battlefield organization as a criteria to assess the effectiveness of a concept of the operation.

CTAC's instruction of the Fundamentals of Combat Operations has influenced the army officer corp's tactical approach. The college requires all CGSC students to take course C310, *Fundamentals of Combat Operations*. The purpose of C310's instruction was as follows:

C310, Fundamentals of Combat Operations, is the foundation for all combined arms instruction within the resident Command and General Staff Officer Course. . . . C310 will teach you how commanders and their staffs plan and conduct combat operations at the tactical level of war.<sup>1</sup>

Based on the scope of this course, C310 sets the tactical foundations for all the other tactical courses in CGSC. The concepts that were studied, taught and critique in the course will shape the CGSC student's tactical thinking processes. Upon graduation, the student will take C310's concepts and ideas and incorporate them in his next duty

assignment. Consequently the concepts and ideas taught in C310 will permeate and influence the army officer corps tactical thinking process not only on the battalion and brigade levels, but corp-wide, thus shaping army's tactical process.

Until June of 1995, C310 used battlefield organization to assess the effectiveness of a concept of operations to accomplish the mission. The course used a grading sheet for assessing the effectiveness of the concept of the operation's course of action. An example of the grading sheet was illustrated in figure 14 (C310 Academic Year (AY) 93-94 Examination 2 Version A). Figure 14, under the paragraph framework, identified whether the course of action in the concept of operation exhibited a battlefield organization pattern. The grading sheet attempted to determine which units fit in that pattern. If the pattern of battlefield organization was not identifiable, the possible percentage points subtracted from the student's grade was approximately 39 percent.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the grade sheet, the course never assessed whether the concept of the operation communicated a decisive point, defined the purposes for each unit, or illuminated the units' interrelationships. Therefore, if a CGSC student's concept of the operation did not reflect the elements of battlefield organization, then the student could potentially receive a failing score of 61 percent. CTAC's method of grading a concept of the operation was training the CGSC student to use battlefield organization as the tool to assess the effectiveness of concepts of the operation.

Figure 14

## Grading Sheet for COA Statement and Sketch (30 Points)

<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Possible</u>	<u>Taken off</u>
Basic Introduction		
What: Defend	1.0	_____
When: O/O	1.0	_____
Where: in sector (grids)	1.0	_____
What: Defeat of elements of 2 Army forward of PL BLUE	1.0	_____
Framework		
Close: Overall how/Scheme of Maneuver	5.0	_____
Main Effort		
What unit	2.0	_____
What it does	1.0	_____
Supporting Effort	2.0	_____
What unit	1.0	_____
What it does	1.0	_____
Deep	2.0	_____
What force/unit used	1.0	_____
What it does	2.0	_____
Rear	1.0	_____
What unit used	1.0	_____
What it does	2.0	_____
Security		
What unit used	2.0	_____
What it does	1.0	_____
Reserve	2.0	_____
What unit used	2.0	_____
What it does	2.0	_____
Adhere to Div Cdr Restriction	1.0	_____
General		
Risk Identified . . .		

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Center of Army Tactics, Grading Sheet for COA Statement and Sketch, C310 AY 93-94 Examination 2 Version A. ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 1-2.

Although a new method for grading was published June 1995, many of CGSC's staff appeared to use battlefield organization as the primary tool to assess a concept of the operation's effectiveness. CTAC published a memorandum to all CTAC instructors on 1 June 1995 defining the new procedures for grading concepts of the operation.<sup>3</sup> In the June

1995 memo, the course of action "cut sheet" required the student to address "all relevant elements of the battlefield framework."<sup>4</sup> The cut sheet weighted 10 percent of the grade on addressing the relevant elements.<sup>5</sup> In the same memo, CTAC defined the grading outline for OPORD/OPLANS. Question 3 on the grade sheet asks the following:

(3) Does it address the five relevant elements of the battlefield framework? A complete description of the close battle, deep operations, and rear operations, as well as reserve and security of the force as a whole is presented in this subparagraph.<sup>6</sup>

Both grading sheets in the new memo still incorporate battlefield organization in the assessment. However, based on the grading scheme, CTAC appeared to be reducing the importance of battlefield organization in the concept.<sup>7</sup> In the new grading sheets, battlefield organization assessment was worth approximately 10 percent of the assessment versus almost 40 percent in the earlier Academic Year (AY) 93-94 standard. In varying degrees of standards, CTAC is still using battlefield organization to assess the concepts of the operation's effectiveness.

Consequently, in order to develop a concept of the operation to CTAC's standard, it must have battlefield organization identifiable in the concept. To achieve the CTAC's standard, CGSC students must conform to this prescriptive format to develop a concept of the operation. Two possible effects could emerge. First, rather than doctrinally defining a decisive point for the operation, the student arrayed his forces according to the patterns of battlefield organization. Second, since battlefield organization was the tool for assessment, the student may not recognize when a concept of a operation lacked a decisive point, main and supporting efforts purpose, and their interrelationships between them. Finally, in all four scenario's concept of the operation,

the officers who drafted the concept of the operations were exposed to the earlier CTAC's standards on battlefield organization

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, C310, Fundamentals of Combat Operations. ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), i.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Center of Army Tactics, Grading Sheet for COA Statement and Sketch, C310 AY 93-94 Examination 2 Version A. ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 1-2.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Center of Army Tactics, MEMORANDUM FOR CTAC Instructors dated 1 June 1995, SUBJECT: Instruction Standing Operating Procedures, Enclosure 4 (Cut Sheet) to CTAC Instruction SOP "COURSE OF ACTION CUT SHEET" ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 1, 2.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 4, 5.

<sup>7</sup>Edward J. Brennan, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Center of Army Tactics Instructor, interview by Wade D. Rush, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Center of Army Tactics department, 25 April 1996.



## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

During the process of this study, the research created two survey groups to represent typical orders groups. Based on the surveyee's understanding of the four concepts of the operation, the study rendered definitive conclusions on each concept of the operation's effectiveness. From these conclusions, the study then examined the survey group's assessment of the concept of the operation in terms of battlefield organization. After tabulating, comparing, and contrasting the data, the research made three conclusions relevant to the research question:

1. Battlefield organization was neither designed for, nor capable of, assessing a concept of the operation's effectiveness.
2. Battlefield organization's concept has marginal use in the conflicts envisioned in the near future.
3. The army officer corps' tactical decision-making leans toward prescriptive thinking incapable of recognizing an inadequate concept of the operation.

From these conclusions, the research determined that battlefield organization degrades the commander's concept of the operation in accomplishing the mission.

Looking at the first conclusion in further depth, the doctrinal concept of battlefield organization exceeded its potential with the

publication of the 1993 FM 100-5, *Operations*. The original design for battlefield organization was to help shift the army officer corps from active defense to an AirLand Battle doctrine. Later, doctrine began to use battlefield organization as a tool to synchronize an already developed concept of the operation. Eventually, doctrine began to use battlefield organization as the tool to develop the concept of the operation. At this point, doctrine began to exceed the concept's designed potential. Battlefield organization was never designed to address the concept of the operation's decisive point. Yet, the research has shown that when failing to identify a decisive point to a group of officers, those officers will determine their own separate decisive point. As a result, the group will have disparate points of view in accomplishing the mission.

CGSC tactics department is using battlefield organization as the standard for critiquing the concept of the operation. But, as the research demonstrated, when using battlefield organization to assess the effectiveness of the concept of the operation, the officers were not able to identify ineffective concepts of the operation. Battlefield organization concept does not assess the decisive point, the interrelationship with the main and supporting efforts, nor the purpose of the efforts within the concept of the operation. Hence, this concept design was misapplied and incapable of critiquing the effectiveness of the concept of the operation.

The battlefield organization concept has marginal utility in the conflicts of the future. In today's operations, other than possibly Korea and Iraq, battlefield organization has exceeded its life span.

The concept was originally arrayed against Soviet-modeled threats. During the development of AirLand Battle, General Donn A. Starry, TRADOC commander, stated the following, "The extended battlefield concept primarily dealt with war in areas of the world where there were large numbers of relatively modern, well-equipped forces who used Soviet-style operational concepts and tactics."<sup>1</sup> The 1981 term, extending the battle, was later named AirLand Battle in the 1982 publication of FM 100-5. Today, the Soviet Union's military might was severely diminished and fragmented in to smaller states. Iraq and particullary Korea were the only states with a large enough military force to replicate the past Soviet-model threat. Deep, rear, and reconnaissance operations for humanitarian efforts, peacekeeping operations, and Just Cause may not apply to battlefield organization. Simply defining a unit as the main effort did not ensure a successful humanitarian relief operation. Security operations were not required for concepts of operation dealing with fighting forest fires in Idaho. The battlefield organization's mold did not fit today's environment, threats, or missions.

The army officer corps' tactical decision making leaned toward prescriptive thinking incapable of recognizing an inadequate concept of the operation. In this research, the study group's behavior and what CGSC teaches corrobaborate with each other. When applying battlefield organization to assess the concept of the operation, none of the survey groups were able to identify the three ineffective concepts of the operation. Rather, the officers considered an operation effective if the four elements of battlefield organization's were distinguishable in the concept. Hence, with what was taught at CGSC and the survey group's

demonstrated behavior, the army was allowing the officer corps to conform to prescriptive thinking rather than promoting independent thought.

Recommendations: First, the original purpose for battlefield organization culminated in 1986 publication of FM 100-5. The research suggests TRADOC adopt BG Lon E. Maggert's suggestion that battlefield organization utility in doctrine is no longer applicable. Second, if the army continues to use battlefield organization in doctrine, its effectiveness is best used as a tool to synchronize already developed concepts of the operation. Third, CGSC should eliminate instructing officers to rely on battlefield organization as a tool to assess the adequacy of the concept of the operation.

Research has shown that battlefield organization creates a false sense of analysis of the concept of the operation's effectiveness. One tactics instructor's comments exemplified this false comfort zone associated with battlefield organization. During a course of action brief, the tactics instructor stated to the class, "I would prefer you to brief your course of action in terms of battlefield organization. I feel much more comfortable with that structure." Consequently, if our doctrine and tactics schools allow battlefield organization to drive our thought process, then our soldiers will rely on prescriptive thinking in solving tactical problems that require unique solutions.

Further Research Recommended: The study was limited to brigade and battalion level. Because of the unit's size, the analysis of deep and rear was left out of this study. Based on preliminary conclusions,

further research on the effects of battlefield organization on corps and division level concept of operation merits attention.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>General Donn A. Starry, TRADOC Commander, "Extending the Battlefield," Military Review 61, no. 3 (March 1981): 32.

APPENDIX A  
SURVEY PACKETS

Appendix A contains the primary elements of the two survey packets that were issued to the survey groups. Survey packet 12 contains Scenario 1 and 2, and survey packet AB contains Scenario A & B. Some of the sketches, all of the overlays, and the topography maps that were issued to the survey group in the original survey packets are not present in this appendix.

## SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS PACKET 12

1. Purpose: This survey is designed to obtain specific and unbiased analysis/assessment of two (2) Brigade/Battalion operational orders (OPORDs). The two scenarios were actual OPORDs obtained from units training at the Combat Training Centers (CTC).

2. Requirement:

a. Analyze two historical operation orders that have been abridged to the essential elements of the concept of operation.

b. Your analysis will most likely require independent COA development and some wargaming in order to fully assess the scenario.

c. Remember, the unit, not the surveyor, wrote these OPORDs and graphics. This survey is extracted word for word from the OPORDs. This survey only omitted SOP information, CEOI information, etc. which are not required for this study.

d. Assume that the enemy SITEmps are correct.

e. After your analysis, you will then answer a battery of survey questions. Please answer all questions. Some questions may have multiple blanks requiring an answer for each.

<b>(ANSWER MATRIX)</b>						
ANSWER QUALIFIER	NOT APPLICABLE	NO	NO (with) QUALIFIERS	NEUTRAL	YES	YES (with) QUALIFIERS
ANSWER CODE	N/A	NO	NO/QF	NEUTRAL	YES	YES/QF

f. Answer matrixes definitions

**Not Applicable:** Self explanatory

**No or yes (with) Qualifiers:** Your answer is yes or no but with some qualifiers

**No or yes:** Your answer is yes or no, and it does not require any qualifiers.

**Neutral:** Your answer could be yes or no.



3. Survey scenario structure: Each scenario is similarly packaged to ease their study and analysis.

- a. Cover sheet identifies:      \* Scenario #  
                                     \* Type of Bluefor Unit  
                                     \* Type of operation.
- b. Sketch that depicts:           \* Unit's Area of Interest  
                                     \* Area of Operation,  
                                     \* Enemy's order of battle that the  
   unit will be specifically  
   engaging.
- c. Unit OPORD                       \* Complete concept of operation as  
   written by the UNIT transferred  
   onto this survey.
- d. Map and graphics:               \* Unit's actual operation Graphics  
   \* Probable Enemy COA SITEMP
- e. Scenario \_\_# Survey Questionnaire

4. Doctrinal Common Definitions: Please familiarize yourself with these doctrinal definitions. This will ensure that all the surveyors are operating on the same exact definitions.

a. Decisive Point- (1) FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-7 & 6-8; "Decisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action."

(2) FM 7-20, 1992, p. 2-4; "Success by the main effort at the decisive point should result in the success of the commander's mission."

b. Battlefield Organization- FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-13; Three closely related activities, with complementary elements, which characterizes operations within an AO:

Offense  
(FM 100-5, 1993, p. 7-12,7-13)

(1) Deep Ops-

(2) Close Ops-

- \* Reconnaissance & Security
- \* Main Effort
- \* Supporting Effort
- \* Reserve

(3) Rear Ops-

Defense

(FM 100-5, 1993, P. 9-3,9-5)

(1) Deep Ops-

(2) Close Ops-

- \* Security
- \* Main Effort
- \* Supporting Effort
- \* Reserve

(3) Rear Ops-

5. Suspense: Returned or ready for pickup  
NLT \_\_\_\_\_.


# SCENARIO 1

## BDE CBT TEAM (MOVEMENT TO CONTACT)

## SCENARIO 1

### MRR ADVANCE GUARD

ADVANCE GUARD MAIN BODY (AGMB)	ANTI-TANK PLATOON (AT PLT.)	FORWARD SUPPORT ELEMENT (FSE)	COMBAT RECONN PATROL (CRP)
<div> <div>MRC</div> <div>MRC</div> <div>MRC</div> <div>2 x T72</div> <div>3 x T72</div> <div>10 x BMP</div> <div>9 x BMP</div> <div>2 x T72</div> <div>1 x M103</div> </div>	<div>3 x AT-5</div>	<div>3 x T72</div> <div>11 x BMP</div> <div>3 x 122mm SP</div> <div>1 x M551</div>	<div>3 x BMP</div>



BCT S2: MRR's ADV GUARD IN BCT's AREA OF INTEREST IS FORCE ORIENTED.

## SCENARIO 1

### BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) TASK ORGANIZATION

<u>ARMOR TF</u>	<u>LT INF TF</u>	<u>FIRES</u>	<u>BDE CONT</u>
AR CO(-)	LT INF CO	FA BN (155) DS	ENG BN
AR CO	LT INF CO	FA BN (155) R	CHEM CO
IN CO	LT INF CO	6 CAS SORTIES	ADA CO
IN CO	TOW CO		MI CO
	LT SCT PLT		MP PLT
	AR SCT PLT		I ARMOR PLT

#### DIV MSN/CONCEPT:

MSN: Division attacks to destroy advance guard MRB. CONCEPT: Div will use BAI, MLRS to destroy 2nd Echelon regiments of lead divisions. DS fire assets will be employed to destroy 1st echelon regiments.

**BCT MSN:** BCT attacks to **DESTROY** the MRR's Advance Guard battalion (+).

**Endstate:** Brigade has destroyed the AGMB without penetration of PL Florida.

#### A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

BCT conducts MTC in zone orienting OBJ Ford and Widow. LT TF M.E. initially occupies OBJ Widow to destroy CRP and FSE by direct/indirect fires and denies enemy the use of southern axis into the zone. AR TF occupies ABF 4A orienting fires into EA TUSKER to destroy remnant of FSE and the AGMB. BCT Reserve (TK PLT from AR TF) follows AR TF AND occupies ABF R 1 to destroy Plt size units that penetrate ABF 4A. MP Plt is TCF.

(1) **Maneuver.** Sc/AR TF establish screen along PL Florida from 1500 to 2200hrs prior to AR TF's LD. AR TF provides a Team to secure the LD the night prior to crossing the LD, and denies enemy penetration of PL Florida by recon. At 2200hrs, LT TF (M.E.) escorted by Sets from the AR TF moves west and secures Obj Widow to establish defense oriented west. At 0500 hrs, CM smoke plt crosses LD and positions along PL Ohio to initiate smoke screen at 0600 to screen movement of AR TF as it crosses the LD. Also, 0500 hrs, Sets from AR TF occupy screen along PL Alaska and position to observe eastern exits of the passes located vicinity PL TEXAS.

LT TF Sets occupy OP 4 and OP 5. AR TF crosses LD at 0700 and on order occupies ABF 4A. The trigger to occupy ABF 4A is FSE reported at PL TEXAS. AR TF becomes M.E. when Adv Guard Main Body enters EA TUSKER. O/O, LT TF position Tow company at ABF 2A orienting fires into EA TUSKER. AR TF is prepared to occupy ABF 4B. If FSE is not at PL Texas, AR TF continues MTC to occupy ABF 4C orienting on EA Power to destroy FSE and Adv Guard Main Body. BCT Reserve is prepared to occupy ABF R2 or ABF R3 to destroy plt sized units penetrating ABF 4A or ABF 4B respectively.

TCF is prepared to defeat level I & II threats in BCT rear.

#### **B. Task to Maneuver units**

**AR TF:** B/P to destroy enemy AIR ASLT in zone. B/P to reconstitute Set Plt w/1x INF Plt. If BCT reserve is committed, B/P to provide TK plt as BCT reserve. O/O, provide INF plt to destroy enemy DRT in zone. Set from AR TF OPCON to LT TF 16 hrs prior to AR TF crossing LD.

**LT TF:** B/P to occupy ABF 2B to destroy CRP. O/O, provide INF plt to destroy enemy DRT's

**BCT Reserve:** upon occupying ABF R1 recon routes to R2 and R3 and report movement time to BCT's main Cp

# SCENARIO 1

MMAS survey criteria: Answer each question with one of the six given responses.

## **(ANSWER MATRIX)**

ANSWER QUALIFIER	<u>Not</u> <u>Applicable</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>NO</u> <u>(WITH)</u> <u>QUALIFIERS</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>YES</u> <u>(WITH)</u> <u>QUALIFIERS</u>	<u>YES</u>
---------------------	---------------------------------	-----------	---	----------------	--	------------

ANSWER CODE	N/A	NO	NO/QF	NEUTRAL	YES/QF	YES
----------------	-----	----	-------	---------	--------	-----

1. Does the commander's concept of operation appear to have a doctrinal battlefield organization for:

(a) Deep? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Close:

(1) Security/Reconnaissance? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Main Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Supporting Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Reserve? \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Rear? \_\_\_\_\_

2. For each unit specified, identify whether the unit fits into the elements of battlefield organization. (Please use the answer matrix for each blank space)

	Security & Recon	Main Effort	Supporting Effort	Reserve	Rear
Armor TF	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
LT INF TF	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
BDE CONT.					
ARMOR PLT	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Bde's MP PLT	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
LT INF SCTs	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Armor SCTs	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____

# SCENARIO 1

3. Although the commander may have not verbalized it, did the commander select a decisive point in his concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

4. In his concept of operation, did the commander select a decisive point which dominates the enemy's probable COA? \_\_\_\_\_

5. From this operations plan does the Bde Cbt Team have the initiative over the enemy's Advance Guard? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Based on his concept of operation, where do you think the commander selected his decisive point at:

Along AA#1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

Along AA#2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

EA TUSKER ? \_\_\_\_\_

AGMB ? \_\_\_\_\_

One of the MRCs in the AGMB ? \_\_\_\_\_

One of the passes vic PL Texas? \_\_\_\_\_

FSE ? \_\_\_\_\_

OBJ Widow ? \_\_\_\_\_

Other not defined here? \_\_\_\_\_

The Cdr did not select a decisive point? \_\_\_\_\_

7. Based on the TF mission, TF organization, enemy's probable COA, and terrain, where do you think the decisive point should be at:

Along AA#1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

Along AA#2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

EA TUSKER ? \_\_\_\_\_

AGMB ? \_\_\_\_\_

One of the MRCs in the AGMB ? \_\_\_\_\_

One of the passes vic PL Texas? \_\_\_\_\_

FSE ? \_\_\_\_\_

**SCENARIO 1**

OBJ Widow ? \_\_\_\_\_

Other not defined here? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Does the light Inf TF missions to destroy CRP and FSE; and deny the enemy use of the southern axis into the zone conflict with each other? \_\_\_\_\_

9. Based on the Bde commander's concept of operation, if you were the LT INF TF commander, do you understand where the Bde Cdr considers the decisive point for the entire bde operation? \_\_\_\_\_

10. Based on the Bde Cdr's concept of operation, if the ARMOR TF moves to ABF 4C and engages the enemy, if you were the LT INF TF Cdr, is it clear where the Cdr's decisive point is? \_\_\_\_\_

11. (Based on the Bde Cdr's concept)- The Adv Grd Main Body (AGMB) will allow itself to fully enter into EA Tusker? \_\_\_\_\_

12. (Based on the Bde Cdr's concept)-The enemy will allow the LT INF Bn to destroy the CRP that is moving along AA#3? \_\_\_\_\_

13. (Based on the Bde Cdr's concept)-After the LT INF TF engages the CRP along AA#3, the enemy will allow the LT INF TF to destroy the FSE? \_\_\_\_\_

14. Because of the type of operation, will the brigade reserve be in feasible supporting distance? \_\_\_\_\_

15. Is a reserve absolutely required for this concept of operation to ensure mission accomplishment? \_\_\_\_\_

16. Is a tactical combat force practical for this Bde's mission? \_\_\_\_\_

17. How many companies/Tms does the commander's concept of operation expect to fire into EA TUSKER?

One? \_\_\_\_\_

Two? \_\_\_\_\_

Three? \_\_\_\_\_

FOUR? \_\_\_\_\_

FIVE? \_\_\_\_\_

SIX? \_\_\_\_\_

**SCENARIO 1**

18. If the commander has allocated combat power in to the battlefield framework, does his allocation of combat power in battlefield organization (Deep, Security & Recon, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security and Recon ? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_

Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

19. Do the units in each element of the battlefield organization (Deep, Security & Recon, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment.

Deep? \_\_\_\_\_

Security and Recon? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve? \_\_\_\_\_


Rear? \_\_\_\_\_



## SCENARIO 2

### MECH TASK FORCE (DELIBERATE DEFENSE)

# SCENARIO 2 1ST ECHELON MRR (ORDER OF BATTLE)



## SCENARIO 2

### MECH TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

ALPHA	BRAVO	CHARLIE	DELTA	TF CONT.
MECH TM	MECH TM	MECH CO.	ARMOR TM	SCT PLT
MECH PLT	MECH PLT	MECH PLT	ARMOR PLT	MTR PLT
MECH PLT	MECH PLT	MECH PLT	ARMOR PLT	ENG CO.
AR PLT	AR PLT	MECH PLT	MECH PLT	ADA PLT
	SMK PLT (DS)			

#### BDE CBT TM MSN:

BCT Defends In Sector (DIS) along PL Vulture NLT 0700 hrs April to defeat the 4 MRD.

MECH TF MSN: TF DIS along PL Vulture to defeat MRR of the 4th MRD.

#### MECH TF INTENT:

- Fight aggressive counter recon fight to take away enemy's eyes.
- Use one Tm in the north with smoke assets to deceive the enemy.
- Mass 3 companies in center & South to defeat enemy.
- Finish enemy with reserve a depth able to flex North, Center, & South.

#### CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

Mech TF: will initiate its defense with an aggressive Counter recon fight. C Mech Co. with 3 mech plts and the scouts will destroy enemy recon prior to PL Vulture. B Mech Tm will destroy enemy recon out to PL Eagle, and smoke their sector in order to show TF strength in the North. Remaining companies will position vehicles forward of BP's to deceive the enemy of their actual defensive psns location. During the main battle, C Mech Co. will occupy hide positions vic BP 22. B Mech Tm will collapse to BP 31 and the scouts will come under TF control. As the Lead MRBs enter the TF sector, A Mech Tm will destroy enemy in EA Slash, A Tank Tm will destroy enemy in EA crush, and B Mech Tm will destroy enemy in EA Cut. C Mech Co will move from hide positions to reverse slope positions on BP 22 and engage enemy in EA Stab. D Tank TM, The TF reserve, will give flexibility to the operation by attacking North to ABF 1, South to ABF 2, or along Rte Seattle to ABF 3 to complete the defeat of the enemy MRR.

#### MECH OPORD SYNCH MATRIX

##### A Mech Tm:

- (Occupy): BP 11
- (O/O): move out to hide positions
- (Defend): EA Slash
- (Deception): Occupy positions Fwd of BP pull back O/O.

##### B Mech Tm:

- (Occupy): BP 31
- (O/O): Collapse to BP 31
- (Defend): EA Cut
- (Deception): Counter fight in sector. O/O pull back to BP 31 kill all recon in sector smoke north.

##### C Mech Tm:

- (Occupy): Counter recon fight from PL Vulture to PL Eagle in sector. Receive SC'TS OP'CON to C Mech Tm
- (O/O): BP 22
- (Defend): EA Stab
- (Deception): Occupy reverse slope position on BP 22. Remain in hide position until MRB passes.

##### D TANK Tm:

- (Occupy): AA STEEL, Orient on Axis Iowa,, Name, and Rte Seattle
- (Defend): Reserve
- (B/P): Rte Seattle to ABF 3, Axis Name to ABF 1, Axis Iowa to ABF 2

(Deception): Do not occupy AA steel until after enemy artillery prep.

##### A TANK Tm:

- (Occupy): BP 21
- (O/O): Move out of deception positions.
- (Defend): EA Crush
- (Deception) Maintain positions fwd of BP, O/O occupy BP 21

## SCENARIO 2

MMAS survey criteria: Answer each question with one of the six given responses.

### (ANSWER MATRIX)

ANSWER QUALIFIER	<u>Not</u> <u>Applicable</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>NO</u> <u>(WITH)</u> <u>QUALIFIERS</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>YES</u> <u>(WITH)</u> <u>QUALIFIERS</u>	<u>YES</u>
ANSWER CODE	N/A	NO	NO/QF	NEUTRAL	YES/QF	YES

1. Does the commander's concept of operation appear to have a doctrinal battlefield organization for:

(a) Deep? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Close:

(1) Security? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Main Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Supporting Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Reserve? \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Rear? \_\_\_\_\_

2. For each company, identify whether the unit fits into the elements of battlefield organization. (Please use the answer matrix for each blank space.)

	Security	Main Effort	Supporting Effort	Reserve	Rear
Alpha MECH Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
BRAVO MECH Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
CHARLIE MECH Co	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
ALPHA TANK Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
DELTA TANK Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____

3. Although the commander may have not verbalized it, did the commander select a decisive point in his concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

## SCENARIO 2

4. In his concept of operation, does the commander select a decisive point which dominates the enemy's probable COA? \_\_\_\_\_

5. From the TF cdr's concept of operation, can the MECH TF seize the initiative from the enemy? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Based on his concept of operation, where do you think the commander selected his decisive point at: (answer all blank spaces utilizing the Ans Matrix)

Along AA #1 ? _____	ALONG AA2 ? _____
Along AA #2 ? _____	Vic EA Cut ? _____
Along AA #3 ? _____	ABF 3 ? _____
ALONG AA #4 ? _____	ABF 2 ? _____
Vic EA Stab ? _____	ABF 1 ? _____
Vic EA Crush ? _____	Others not specified ? _____
Vic EA Slash ? _____	Cdr did not select a decisive Point ? _____

7. Based on the TF mission, TF organization, enemy's probable COA, and terrain, where do you think the decisive point should be at: (answer all blank spaces utilizing the Ans Matrix)

Along AA #1 ? _____	ALONG AA2 ? _____
Along AA #2 ? _____	Vic EA Cut ? _____
Along AA #3 ? _____	ABF 3 ? _____
ALONG AA #4 ? _____	ABF 2 ? _____
Vic EA Stab ? _____	ABF 1 ? _____
Vic EA Crush ? _____	Others not specified ? _____
vic EA Slash ? _____	

8. Based on the Commander's concept of operation, if you were the Delta Tank Cdr (the TF's designated reserve), do you understand where the Bn Cdr considers the decisive point for this operation? \_\_\_\_\_

## SCENARIO 2

9. In the Cdr's concept of operation, quote:

"The TF reserve, will give flexibility to the operation by attacking North to ABF 1, South to ABF 2, or along Rte Seattle to ABF 3 to complete the defeat of the enemy MRR."

Based on this concept of operation, does the Task Force Cdr consider the designated reserve company a critical factor in accomplishing his mission? \_\_\_\_\_

10. Is a designated reserve required for this concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

11. Is C Mech's counterreconn mission achievable for this concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Based on the concept of the operation, should C Mech/Scts [C Mech(+)] be the only unit conducting counterreconn in this defense in sector? \_\_\_\_\_

13. Should A Tank have a portion of C Mech(+)'s counterreconn mission & sector? \_\_\_\_\_

14. Should A Mech have a portion of C Mech(+)'s counterreconn mission & sector? \_\_\_\_\_

15. Should D Tank have a portion of C Mech(+)'s counterreconn mission & sector? \_\_\_\_\_

16. Based on the Concept of operation, does EA STAB appears to have two separate and simultaneous battles ? \_\_\_\_\_

17. If the commander has allocated combat power in to the battlefield organization, does his allocation of combat power in battlefield organization (Deep, Security, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_

Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

## SCENARIO 2

18. Does the units in each element of the battlefield organization, (Deep, Security, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security ? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_

Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

## SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS PACKET AB

1. Purpose: This survey is designed to obtain specific and unbiased analysis/assessment of two (2) Brigade/Battalion operational orders (OPORDs). The two scenarios were actual OPORDs obtained from units training at the Combat Training Centers (CTC).

2. Requirement:

a. Analyze 2 historical operation orders that have been abridged to the essential elements of the concept of operation.

b. Your analysis will most likely require independent COA development and some wargaming in order to fully assess the scenario.

c. Remember, the unit, not the surveyor, wrote these OPORDs and graphics. This survey is extracted word for word from the OPORDs. This survey only omitted SOP information, CEOI information, etc. which are not required for this study.

d. Assume that the enemy SITEmps are correct.

e. After your analysis, you will then answer a battery of survey questions. Please answer all questions. Some questions may have multiple blanks requiring an answer for each.

(ANSWER MATRIX)						
ANSWER QUALIFIER	NOT APPLICABLE	NO	NO (with) QUALIFIERS	NEUTRAL	YES	YES (with) QUALIFIERS
ANSWER CODE	N/A	NO	NO/QF	NEUTRAL	YES	YES/QF

f. Answer matrixes definitions

**Not Applicable:** Self explanatory

**No or yes (with) Qualifiers:** Your answer is yes or no but with some qualifiers

**No or yes:** Your answer is yes or no, and it does not require any qualifiers.

**Neutral:** Your answer could be yes or no.



3. Survey scenario structure: Each scenario is similarly packaged to ease their study and analysis.

- a. Cover sheet identifies:
  - \* Scenario #
  - \* Type of Bluefor Unit
  - \* Type of operation.
- b. Sketch that depicts:
  - \* Unit's Area of Interest
  - \* Area of Operation,
  - \* Enemy's order of battle that the unit will be specifically engaging.
- c. Unit OPORD
  - \* Complete concept of operation as written by the UNIT transferred onto this survey.
- d. Map and graphics:
  - \* Unit's actual operation Graphics
  - \* Probable Enemy COA SITEMP
- e. Scenario \_\_# Survey Questionnaire

4. Doctrinal Common Definitions: Please familiarize yourself with these doctrinal definitions. This will ensure that all the surveyors are operating on the same exact definitions.

a. Decisive Point- (1) FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-7 & 6-8; "Decisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action."

(2) FM 7-20, 1992, p. 2-4; "Success by the main effort at the decisive point should result in the success of the commander's mission."

b. Battlefield Organization- FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-13; Three closely related activities, with complementary elements, which characterizes operations within an AO:

Offense  
(FM 100-5, 1993, p. 7-12,7-13)

(1) Deep Ops-

(2) Close Ops-

- \* Reconnaissance & Security
- \* Main Effort
- \* Supporting Effort
- \* Reserve

(3) Rear Ops-

Defense  
(FM 100-5, 1993, P. 9-3,9-5)

(1) Deep Ops-

(2) Close Ops-

- \* Security
- \* Main Effort
- \* Supporting Effort
- \* Reserve

(3) Rear Ops-

5. Suspense: Returned or ready for pickup  
NLT \_\_\_\_\_.

## SCENARIO A

### AIRBORNE TASK FORCE (DELIBERATE ATTACK)

## SCENARIO A

### MRB(-) MODIFIED SECURITY ZONE

#### MRB STRENGTH (40%)


#### AREA OF INTEREST

MRR MSN: Defends three Battle Positions to destroy enemy forces and prevent pursuit of 6th Motorized Infantry Division's withdrawal back into friendly Atlantica borders..

MRR Concept: conducts Deliberate Defense and forces bluefor to sustain losses up to 60%. in order to culminate its offense. The withdrawal criteria from each MRB's Battle Positions is 30% strength remaining.

MRR Fires: attrited Bluefor and resticted Bluefor's ability to bypass and mass forces..

#### SKETCH



#### MRB'S ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE (40 % strength)

<u>Co(-) BP #1</u>	<u>Co(-) BP #2</u>	<u>Co(-) BP#3</u>
Co Cp	Co Cp	Co Cp
2 Inf Sqds	2 Inf Sqds	2 Inf Sqds

#### MRB(-) Control

2 x 82 mm Mortars  
1 Inf Sqd Counterattack  
3 x T-62 Tank

#### MRR CTK FORCE

4 x T-62 Tank  
3 x BMP  
1 x ZSU

SKETCH

## SCENARIO A

### ABN TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

<u>ALPHA</u> <u>LIGHT TM</u>	<u>BECK</u> <u>LIGHT TM</u>	<u>BRAVO</u> <u>LIGHT TM</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u> <u>LIGHT CO</u>	<u>TF CONT</u>	<u>CBT</u> <u>TRAINS</u>	<u>BSA</u>
LT PLT	LT PLT	LT PLT(-)	LT PLT	SCT PLT	AT PLT	AT PLT
LT PLT	LT PLT	AT PLT	LT PLT	MTR PLT		INF SQD
LT PLT	LT PLT	MECH PLT		SQD INF		
LT PLT (-)	LT PLT	PSYOPS SEC		AT PLT		
ENG SQD	ENG PLT			AT PLT		
				SQD INF		

**ABN BDE MSN:** Abn Bde attacks at night to destroy enemy vic Objs Polk, Lee, and Hood and clears enemy in zone to Phase Line Orange to facilitate Div. counteroffensive.

### **CONCEPT OF OPERATION:**

(See Operations Graphics)

**BDE INTENT:** Destroy enemy in zone to facilitate Joint Task Force (JTF) 140's counter offensive Ops with one Mech Bde. JTF 140's one mech bde counter offense will occur to south of our Abn Bde's zone..

**BDE CONCEPT:** From Ld to PL Purple, bde conducts deliberate atk to destroy enemy on Object Hood, Lee, and Polk, the Avn bde will destroy enemy counterattack forces. PL Purple to PL Orange, clear in zone.

**ABN TF MSN:** TF attacks at night to destroy the enemy vic OBJ HOOD and clear in zone to PL Orange in order to facilitate JTF 140's counter- offensive ops.

#### **ABN TF INTENT:**

**Purpose:** Destroy enemy forces vic OBJ Hood and in zone to facilitate execution of the JTF 140 Counteroffensive operation

**Method:** Early recon to locate enemy; Harass & Interdiction fires to disrupt enemy defensive preparation on Obj Hood; infiltrate undetected to Obj Hood; Attack enemy weakness on Obj Hood; Deliberate night attack to seize Obj Hood; Movement to Contact from Obj Hood to PL Orange to destroy the remaining enemy in zone.

**Decisive point:** on Obj Hood is our ability to breach defensive obstacles in order to mass Cbt Power on the Obj. During Movement To Contact (MTC), the Decisive Point is locating and destroying enemy's Indirect, ADA, and logistical resupply caches.

**Success:** Enemy forces destroyed on Obj Hood and then in Zone.

**End State:** Deployed along PL Orange to continue offensive operations.

## SCENARIO A

MMAS survey criteria: Answer each question with one of the six given responses.

### (ANSWER MATRIX)

ANSWER QUALIFIER	<u>Not</u> <u>Applicable</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>NO</u> <u>(WITH)</u> <u>QUALIFIERS</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>YES</u> <u>(WITH)</u> <u>QUALIFIERS</u>	<u>YES</u>
ANSWER CODE	N/A	NO	NO/QF	NEUTRAL	YES/QF	YES

1. Does the commander's concept of operation appear to have a doctrinal battlefield organization for:

(a) Deep? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Close:

(1) Security/Reconnaissance? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Main Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Supporting Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Reserve? \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Rear? \_\_\_\_\_

2. For each company, identify whether the unit fits into the elements of battlefield organization. (Please use the answer matrix for each blank space.)

	Security & Recon	Main Effort	Supporting Effort	Reserve	Rear
Alpha LT TM	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Bravo LT TM	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Beck LT TM	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Charlie LT Co	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____

3. Although the commander may have not verbalized it, did the commander select a decisive point in his concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

4. In his concept of operation, does the commander select a decisive point which dominates the enemy's probable COA? \_\_\_\_\_

**SCENARIO A**

5. From this concept of operation, does the ABN TF have the initiative over the enemy's security forces? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Based on his concept of operation, where do you think the commander selected his decisive point at:

ENEMY BP #1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ENEMY BP #2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ENEMY BP #3 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA3 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA PRIMARY ? \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER? \_\_\_\_\_

The Cdr did not select a Decisive Point? \_\_\_\_\_

7. Based on the TF mission, TF organization, enemy's probable COA, and terrain, where do you think the decisive point should be at:

ENEMY BP #1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ENEMY BP #2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ENEMY BP #3 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA3 ? \_\_\_\_\_

ALONG AA PRIMARY? \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Based on the Commander's concept of operation, if you were the company commander of Beck TM, do you understand where the Bn Cdr considers the decisive point for the entire battalion operation? \_\_\_\_\_

9. Is a designated reserve absolutely required for this operation to ensure mission accomplishment? \_\_\_\_\_

**SCENARIO A**

10. Is a reserve required for this concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

11. If the commander has allocated combat power in to the battlefield framework, does his allocation of combat power in battlefield organization (Deep, Security & Recon, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security and Recon ? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_

Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Does the units in each element of the battlefield organization, (Deep, Security & Recon, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security and Recon ? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_

Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

## SCENARIO B

### ARMOR TASK FORCE (DELIBERATE ATTACK)



## SCENARIO B

### DIVISION' MAIN DEFENSIVE BELT IN CONTACT (NO SECURITY ZONE)

#### AREA OF INTEREST

## SKETCH

#### MRB SECTOR'S ORDER OF BATTLE

COP (a)  
1 x BMP

COP (b)  
1 x BMP  
1 x T -72

MRC (A)

MRP #1:  
MRP #2:  
MRP #3:

MRC (B)

MRP #4:  
MRP #5:  
MRP #6:

MRC (C)

MRP #7:  
MRP #8:  
MRP #9:

MRR Reserve

TK Plt : 3 x T-72  
AT Plt: 6 x AT-5

MRB control

MT-12 PLT: 4 X MT-12  
(100 mm AT-GUN)

MRR Control

2 x ZSU  
RAG: 2S3 BN  
2S1 BN

## SCENARIO B

### ARMOR TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

<u>ALPHA</u> <u>TANK TM</u>	<u>BRAVO</u> <u>TANK CO</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u> <u>MECH TM</u>	<u>DELTA</u> <u>TANK CO</u>	<u>TF CONT.</u>
AR PLT	AR PLT	MECH PLT	AR PLT	SCT PLT
AR PLT	AR PLT	MECH PLT	AR PLT	MTR PLT
MECH PLT	AR PLT	TANK CO	AR PLT	ENG CO

**BDE MSN:** Bde attacks 0300 Hrs February to clear enemy forces in zone to PL Maine. On order, continue attack to PL Oklahoma in order to restore the FEBA at PL Oklahoma.

**ARMOR TF MSN:** TF attacks in zone 0300 February to clear enemy forces in zone to PL Main. On order, continue attack to PL Oklahoma in order to restore the FEBA.

**ARMOR TF INTENT:** Employ TF drills in a simple plan that masses at least two companies fires on each platoon. Fires will obscure and suppress Plt-size elements overwatching obstacles. Air defense protection focuss on the breach. TF deception plan portrays an attack in the North to drive commitment of the AT reserve

### CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

#### Tasks to Sub Units:

**B Tank Co:** Be prepared to block flank attacks once TF is through Red Pass vic Obj Boise.

**C Mech Tm:** Be prepared to emplace and secure GSR along LD/LC. Be prepared to replace scouts if destroyed.

**General:** Bypass criteria is plt size or smaller. maintain contact and physically handoff to follow on forces. Minimum of 2 lane breach through Red Pass vic Obj Boise. Attack on Obj Portland is force oriented.

### Armor OPORD Synch Matrix

#### SCTS:

(LD to Pass vic OBJ Boise): Sct #1 w/GSR Tm move on Rte east (Dismounted) and establish OP 1. Determine in priority obstacles and enemy plt positions in east, then conduct recon in MRB's rear to locate reserve AT forces.

(LD to Pass vic OBJ Boise): Sct #2 w/GSR Tm move on Rte west (Dismounted) and establish OP 2. Determine in priority obstacles and enemy plt positions in western sector, then conduct recon in MRB's rear to locate reserve AT forces

### CONCEPT OF OPERATION (continued):

A Tank Tm:

(Ld to Pass) Normal diamond flank security.

(Breach): Breach obstacles in succession

(Main Def Line): Seize Obj Able orient North (AT Reserve): Orient north from Obj Able, on order. Orient east.

(Whale vic PL Delhi): Orient east to destroy forces (Deception): Run along Rte Deception to CP 8 and return from 0001-0130hrs.

#### B Tank Co.:

(LD to Pass): Occupy firing line B1 suppress COP.

(Breach):

(Main Def Line): Occupy firing line B2

(AT Reserve): Seize Obj Baker orient North O/O west.

(Whale vic PL Delhi): Orient west to support

(Deception): Day prior LD, mark Rte Deception with chemlites prior to dark.

#### C Mech Tm:

(LD to Pass):

(Breach): B/P follow A Tm to clear dismounts

(Main Def Line): Follow A Tm thru breach to CP 5

(AT Reserve): Move to firing line C1

(Whale vic PL Delhi): Attack to seize Obj Charlie

(Deception): Night prior to Ld, fake Bradley insertion from 1900-2000hrs

#### D Tank Co.

(LD to Pass): Lead TF Diamond

(Breach): Firing line D1, then pass, then D2

(Main Def Line): Occupy firing line D3

(AT Reserve): O/O seize Obj Dog orient North.

(Whale vic PL Delhi): Orient North to protect TF flank

(Deception):

#### FIRES:

(LD to Pass): Priority to D Tank Co, O/O to B Tank Co.

(Breach): Priority A Mech Tm, o/o to D Tank Co. Smoke def. line. Suppress southern plt.

(Main Def Line) Priority A Tank Tm, O/O D Tank Co. Neutralize southern plt, Smoke south plt.

(AT Reserve) Priority B Tank Co, O/O D Tank Co. Neutralize plts while suppressing others.

(Whale vic PL Delhi): Priority to C Mech Tm

## SCENARIO B

MMAS survey criteria: Answer each question with one of the six given responses.

### (ANSWER MATRIX)

ANSWER	<u>Not</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>
QUALIFIER	<u>Applicable</u>		<u>(WITH)</u>		<u>(WITH)</u>	
			<u>QUALIFIERS</u>		<u>QUALIFIERS</u>	

ANSWER	N/A	NO	NO/QF	NEUTRAL	YES/QF	YES
CODE						

1. Does the commander's concept of operation appear to have a doctrinal battlefield organization for:

(a) Deep? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Close:

(1) Security and Reconnaissance? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Main Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Supporting Effort? \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Reserve? \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Rear? \_\_\_\_\_

2. For each company, identify whether the unit fits into the elements of battlefield organization. (Please use the answer matrix for each blank space.)

	Security & Recon	Main Effort	Supporting Effort	Reserve	Rear
Alpha Tank Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Bravo Tank Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Charlie Mech Tm	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Delta Tank Co	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____
Scts Plt	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____	? _____

3. Although the commander may have not verbalized it, did the commander select a decisive point in his concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

## SCENARIO B

4. In his concept of operation, does the commander select a decisive point which dominates the enemy's probable COA? \_\_\_\_\_

5. From this concept of operation, does the Armor TF retains the initiative over the enemy's defense.? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Based on his concept of operation, where do you think the commander selected his decisive point at:

Obj Portland ? \_\_\_\_\_ Obj Charlie ? \_\_\_\_\_

Obj Able ? \_\_\_\_\_ Obj Boise ? \_\_\_\_\_

SBF C1 ? \_\_\_\_\_ MRP #8 ? \_\_\_\_\_

Obj Dog ? \_\_\_\_\_ T-12 Plt ? \_\_\_\_\_

Obj Baker ? \_\_\_\_\_ Other ? \_\_\_\_\_

Cdr did not select a Decisive point? \_\_\_\_\_

7. Based on the TF mission, TF organization, enemy's probable COA, and terrain, where do you think the decisive point should be at: (answer all blank spaces utilizing the Ans Matrix)

Obj Portland ? \_\_\_\_\_ Obj Charlie ? \_\_\_\_\_

Obj Able ? \_\_\_\_\_ Obj Boise ? \_\_\_\_\_

SBF C1 ? \_\_\_\_\_ MRP #8 ? \_\_\_\_\_

Obj Dog ? \_\_\_\_\_ T-12 Plt ? \_\_\_\_\_

Obj Baker ? \_\_\_\_\_ Other ? \_\_\_\_\_

8. At endstate, where A TM is at OBJ Able, B TM is on OBJ Baker, D TM is on OBJ Dog, and C TM is on OBJ Charlie, do these subsequent main efforts relate to a decisive point in this concept of operation? \_\_\_\_\_

9. At endstate, where A TM is at OBJ Able, B TM is on OBJ Baker, D TM is on OBJ Dog, and C TM is on OBJ Charlie, does this array appear to support a decisive point ? \_\_\_\_\_

10. Is a reserve absolutely required for this operation to ensure mission accomplishment? \_\_\_\_\_

11. When C Mech attempts to occupy SBF C1, The enemy will not commit his Regimental Armor plt reserve against C Mech Co ? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Based on the Concept of operation, does Delta Tank Tm's seizure

## SCENARIO B

of OBJ Dog appear to support a TF decisive point support the commander's decisive point? \_\_\_\_\_

13. Was seizing OBJ Charlie necessary in accomplishing the mission? \_\_\_\_\_

14. The mission was to clear in zone. Which MRPs should be destroyed: (please use answer matrix for all spaces).

MRP#1 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#2 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#3 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#4 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#5 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#6 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#7 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#8 ? \_\_\_\_\_

MRP#9 ? \_\_\_\_\_

15. If the commander has allocated combat power in to the battlefield framework, does his allocation of combat power in battlefield organization (Deep, Security & Recon, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security and Recon ? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_

Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

16. Does the units in each element of the battlefield organization, (Deep, Security & Recon, Main Effort, Supporting Effort, Reserve, and Rear) assist the main effort in mission accomplishment:

Deep ? \_\_\_\_\_

Security and Recon ? \_\_\_\_\_

Main Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Supporting Effort ? \_\_\_\_\_

Reserve ? \_\_\_\_\_


Rear ? \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX B


### ANALYSIS DATUM

1. Survey group's disparity of focus for each situation.


### FIG. 15. SCENARIO 2



### FIG. 16. SCENARIO A




**FIG. 17. SCENARIO B**



2. The survey group's understanding of the commanders decisive point for each scenario's concept of the operation.


**FIG. 18. SCENARIO 1**





**FIG. 19. SCENARIO B**


Understanding the CDR'S Decisive Point



3. For each scenario, the survey group's battlefield organization assessment of the concept of the operation's effectiveness.


**FIG. 20. SCENARIO 2**

B.O. Assessment of Concept of Operation



# FIG. 21. SCENARIO B



B.O. Assessment of Concept of Operation





4. The relationship between battlefield organization assessment and the how distinctive are the four elements of battlefield organization within the concept of the operation.

# FIG. 22. SCENARIO 1



Comparison Batt Org. I.D. vs Assessment




# FIG. 23. SCENARIO A



# FIG. 24. SCENARIO B



5. Survey group's outlines the interrelationship of the main and supporting efforts.



## FIG. 26. SCENARIO B

Main & Spting Efforts Interrelationship





Fig. 27. Organization of the Defense, 1982



Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 January 1982), 10-2a.

FIGURE 28


# 1976 to 1982: BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION EVOLVES

ACTIVE DEFENSE DOCTRINE  
{1976 FM 100-5}

Title: ORGANIZING FOR DEFENSE  
Chapter 5 (Defense)

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE  
{1982 FM 100-5}

Title: ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE  
Chapter 10 (Defense)



(1) COVERING FORCE AREA

(1) DEEP BATTLE OPERATIONS  
in  
Area of Influence

(2) COVERING FORCE OPERATIONS  
to  
Support Main Effort

(2) MAIN BATTLE AREA

(3) MAIN EFFORT in Main Battle Area

(3) REAR AREA

(4) REAR AREA COMBAT OPERATIONS  
(RACO)



(5) RESERVE OPERATIONS  
in  
Support of Main Effort

FIGURE 29

**1982 to 1986: BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION EVOLUTION EXPANDS**








Fig 30. The Offensive Framework, 1986



Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 May 1986), 107.

Fig 31. The Defensive Framework, 1986



Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 May 1986), 138.

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